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ARTICLE
Affirmative Action and the First Amendment: The
Attainment of a Diverse Student Body Is

a

Permissible

Exercise of Institutional Autonomy

Darlene

C.

Goring"

I suspect that it would be impossible to arrange an affrrmative-action
program in a racially neutral way and have it successful. To ask that this be so
is to demand the impossible. In order to get beyond racism, we must first take
accoun t of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons
equally, we must treat them differently. We cannot-we dare not-let the
Equal Protection Clause perpetuate racial supremacy.1

I.

INTRODUCTION

As we prepare to enter the next millennium, issues of race and class
remain at the forefront of America's seemingly never-ending struggle to
reconcile the goal of equality with the social, political, and economic
realities of modem society. As we look forward, unanswered questions
from the past continue to haunt us. The constitutional viability of race
based affirmative action programs is such a question. Although this
question was brought before the United States Supreme Court twenty
years ago in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke,2 a definitive
answer continues to elude us.
In 1978, Allan Bakke and the University of California looked to the
Supreme Court to determine the role that race-based preferences would
play in the allocation of educational opportunities. 3 The challenge of
balancing the competing interests of racial minority groups with the
preservation of equality under the law did not present a novel challenge.

•

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law. B.B.A., Howard

University; J.D. and LL.M., Northwestern University School of Law. For valuable comments and
reactions to earlier drafts of this Article, I would like to thank JohnBatt and Leonard S. Rubinowitz.

I would like to thank Patrick Torre, Lisa M. Wilson, and Jeff Flcischakcr for their research

assistance. I de dicate this Article to my late father Cecil C. Goring.
I. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 407 (1978) (opinion ofBlaclanun,
J.).
2.

8.

3.

Id.; see also infra text accompanying note 8.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 276 (opinion of Powell, J.); see also infra text accompanying note
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Since 1886, the Supreme Court has addressed similar issues in a number

of cases, including Plessy v. Ferguson,4 Yick Wo v. Hopkins,5 Korematsu
United States,6 and Brown v. Board of Education.1 But this time, the
Court in Bakke fragmented into three distinct factions, 8 leaving no
definitive answer, little guidance, and twenty years of controversy

v.

regarding the constitutional pennissibility of race-based admissions
programs.
During the past twenty years, and in the face of continued silence on
this issue from the Court,9 the primary source of guidance has been

163 U.S. 537 (1896). In Plessy, the Supreme Court's analysis of the protections afforded

4.

to blacks pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment reinforced the constitutional permissibility of racial

segregation. Justice Brown concluded that
[t]he object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two
races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality,
or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either.
Id. at 544.
5. 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) ("These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality;
and the. equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.").
6.

•

323 U.S. 214, 219 (1944) (upholding the exclusion of persons of Japanese ancestry from

designated military areas as a valid exercise of congressional war powers during World War
7.

II}.

347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) ("[I]n the field of public education the doctrine of 'separate but

equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.").
8.
opinion.

In Bakke, the Justices split into three primary factions. Justice Powell wrote a the court's
See 438 U.S. at 269. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmon concurred in the

judgment in part and dissented in part. See id. at 324 (arguing that application of the strict scrutiny
test to evaluate the constitutionality of the University's admissions program was inappropriate because
no fundamental right or suspect classification was at issue in the case).

Justices Stevens, Stewart,

Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part See id.
at 408 (concluding that the University's admissions program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964).
9. The Supreme Court refused to hear arguments in Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir.
1996), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996), in which the plaintiffs challenged the race-based
admissions program at the University of Texas School of Law. A similar challenge was raised in
Taxman v. Board of Education, 91 F.3d 1547 (3rd Cir. 1996), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 2506 (1997),

cert. dismissed, 118 S. Ct. 595 (1997). However, fearing a possible adverse decision and in reaction
to the Clinton administration's withdrawal of support, this case was settled for $433,500 in Dece mber
1997, prior to a decision from the Supreme Court. See Melinda Henneberger, On Race, an Optimist

in an Unlikely Place, N.Y. nMES, Dec. 14, 1997, at NJ5; see also Jan Crawford Greenburg, Civil
Rights Groups Pay Teacher to Avoid Court: Coalition Feared Adverse Ruling by High Court Would

Damage Affirmative Action, Cm. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1997, at Al. For a discussion of the reasons
underlying the Taxman settlement, see Nicholas deB. Katzenbach & Burke Marshall, Not Color
Blind: Just Blind, N.Y. nMES, Feb. 22, 1998, § 6 (Magazine), at 42.
This may be the first time that money has been used directly to take
an important public
policy issue off the Court's docket. All this arose because the case
was framed to portray
person-to-person competition for a job in which race alone was
the decisive factor. This
aspect fitted neatly with the notion, widespread among opponen
ts of affirmative action,
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Justice Powell's opinion. In Bakke, Justice Powell accepted as constitu
tionally pennissible the idea that the attainment of diversity can serve as
a compelling justification for the use of race-based preferences in
0
In so doing, he circumvented the Equal
admissions decision-making. 1
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment11 and used the counter
vailing guarantee of academic freedom provided by the First Amend
ment12 to cloak educational institutions in the warm blanket of "institu
tional autonomy."13 The opinion thus provides educational institutions the
right to label decisions about "who may teach, what may be taught, how
it shall be t aught, and who may be admitted"1' as academic decisions
insulated by the constitutionally protected doctrine of academic freedom.
Justice Powell, and the few courts that have followed his lead,
however, have failed to establish a nexus between the exercise of
institutional autonomy and the academic nature of admissions decisions
that are undertaken with the goal of attaining a diverse student body.
The absence of an academic basis for the use of race or ethnicity in this
context raises legitimate concerns that "affinnative action in the name of
diversity is content-based regulation of speech"1s that infringes upon First

Id.

that it creates a zero-sum game in which there is a loser for every winner and that the
game is won and lost on the basis of race. Thus it obscures the larger goal of finding and
preserving room for blacks in all aspects-economic, political, educational, social-and
at all levels of society.

10.
11.

Id.

438 U.S. a t 3 1 1-15.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizen s of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.

12. U.S. CONST. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press;
or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grie vances." Id.

13. The definition of "institutional autonomy " is an evolving amalgam of thoughts and ideas.
Professor Matthew Finkin has described this concept as "a desire in search of a legal theory."
Matthew Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEX. L. REV. 817, 856 (1983). He
continues:
The institutional desire is to be left alone. It calls to mind the condition von Rumbolt
sought for the German university . . . freedom and solitude. It also reminds us that, at
certain points, university autonomy ts a necessary condition for freedom of teaching and
inqui ry ... [a]nd the elemental infirmity in the theory of"institutional" academic freedom
lies in its refusal to admit of distinctions. The desire is laudable-but the theory claims
too much.
Id. at 856-57 .
14.
15.

354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Jim Chen, Diversity and Damnation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1839, 1850 (1996).

See Sweezy v.New Hampshire,
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Amendment rights of other students and faculty within the academy.16
This Article provides an analytic framework for this nexus, and posits
constitutionally permissible justifications for applying the First Amend
ment to insulate the admissions decision-making process.
Part II of this Article examines the expansion of the academic freedom
doctrine, as safeguarded by the First Amendment, to protect decisions
made by educational institutions, and the extent to which the Court has
recognized the rights of institutions to act autonomously. Included is a
discussion of whether the attainment of diversity is a constitutionally
permissible justification for using race-based classifications in a cademic
decision-making.
Part III explores whether the admissions decision-making process falls
within the realm of academic decisions traditionally protected by the First
Amendment. The Court has never articulated a standard for determining
whether the decision-making engaged in by educational institutions is
a cademic and thus protected by the First Amendment or whether it is
unprotected administrative decision-making. I propose a restrictive two
prong standard that focuses on the expertise of the decision-maker as well
as the unique nature of academic decisions.
Through the use of
experiential narratives, I then establish a nexus between the attainment of
diversity and the pedagogical goals of teaching, inquiry, research, and
publication. The use of such anecdotal evidence to establish the impact
of diversity in the classroom is both functional and necessary. These
anecdotes provide a first-hand look into the classroom setting, and
recount the actual experiences of students and faculty in ways that are not
conveyed by reading factual case summaries. 17 The use of anecdotal

16.

See id. at 1875. Professor Chen states:

When a public university admits students or hires or promotes faculty members according
to a diversity-inspired affirmative action plan, it is acting simultaneously as speaker and
regulator. Unless it claims that race or ethnicity per se constitutes "academic" grounds
for favoring a particular student or professor, a university has no legitimate "academic
freedom" defense against rules that proscribe or circumscribe race-based decisionmaking.
Rather, if a university is using affinnative action more loosely to enhance its general
intellectual profile, the diffuse value of any incremental diversity achieved by the
university at large is vastly outweighed by the potential impact on the speech of individual
students and professors.

Id. (citations omitted).
17. See Note, An Evidentiary Framework for Diversity as a Compelling Interest in Higher
Education, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1364 (1996).
Because di� ersity in higher education is not susceptible to direct proof, courts must rely

Id.

o� the testimony of educators regarding the benefits of diversity. Educators have
�1�es�d firsthm:'d the benefits that diverse student bodies
bring to their educ ational
institutions over time. Such individuals arc extremely knowledg
eable about the learning
p rocess and the complexity of its functioning inside and outside
of the classroom.
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evidence to examine the impact of diversity in the classroom is necessary
because of the absence of empirical studies of this area.11
Part IV acknowledges that institutional autonomy does not insulate all
decisions made by educational institutions from constitutional scrutiny.
In Part IV, I explore the question left unanswered by Justice Powell's
opinio n in Bakke; that is, how far can educational institutions go in the
exercise of their right to select a diverse student body before infringing
on the equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment? I
conclude this analysis by relying upon a strict interpretation of the idea
of diversity as conceptualized by Justice Powell, and note ultimately that
diversity cannot be realistically achieved without the consideration of race
and ethnicity as factors in the admissions decision-making process.
II. JUSTICE POWELL'S ADVOCACY OF INSTITimONAL AUTONOMY TO
ACHIEVE STIJDENT BODY DIVERSITY
Academic freedom is traditionally viewed as a right asserted by
individuals, such as students and faculty, in the exercise of their
educational pursuits.19 There is no dispute that First Amendment protec
tion is warranted in this regard. Institutional autonomy, on the other
hand, expands the notion of academic freedom, and with it the protections
of the First Amendment, by recognizing the right of educational
institutions to e ngage in decision-making regarding academic matters with
limited judicial scrutiny. This doctrine serves as the cornerstone for
Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that a university's decision-making

18.

See Elizabeth Mertz et al., What Difference Does Difference Make? The Challenge for

Legal Education, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. I, 4 (1998).

A debate has emerged in recent years over the impact of social difference on law school
education. Studies and anecdotal accounts have suggested that women are disadvantaged
in law school classrooms because of differential patterns of participation and inclusion,
and b ecause of gendered reactions to distinctively legal styles of discourse. Although far
less systematic attention has been paid to the effects of race, class, or school status on

students' experience in law schools, there have been accounts suggesting that students of
color also feel excluded.

Id.
19.

The ideas and concepts discussed in this Article

are

applicable to constitutionally mandated

guarantees of academic freedom. For a discussion of the origins and scope of professional academic.

freedom, see generally Walter P. Metzger, Profession and Constitution: Two Definitions of Academic
Freed om in America, 66 TEx. L. REv. 1265 (1988); Walter P. Metzger, Professional and Legal

Limits to Academic Freedom, 20 J.C. & U.L. 1 (1993); Developments in

the

Law-Academic

Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1968). For additional discussions regarding the development of

constitutional academic freedom, see David M. Rabban, A Functional Ana/ysu of "Individual" and

"Institutional" Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer

1990, at 227; William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and the First Amendment in the Supreme
Court of the United States: An Unhurried Historical Review, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer

1990, at 79.
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process regarding the "selection of its student body" is a valid exercise
0
of its right to academic freedom.2
In this section, I deconstruct the
doctrine of institutional autonomy. Following an examination of the
interplay between the First Amendment and the diversity rationale as set
forth by Justice Powell in Bakke, I explore the development of institution
al autonomy as an extension of traditional n otions of academic freedom.
Embedded within this analytical framework is a discussion of judicial
deference to the decision-making authority of educational institutions that
is the derivative result of extending First Amendment protections to
institutional decision-making. This section concludes with a discussion
of judicial recognition of the doctrine of institutional autonomy to
insulate educational institutions from constitutional scrutiny when the
institutions utilize race-based criteria to select a diverse student body.
The facts of Bakke are all too familiar. Allen Bakke, a white male
m edical school applicant, was denied admission to the Medical School of
the University of California at Davis.21 As a result, he challenged the
constitutionality of the University's race-based affinnative action
program.22 In accordance with the rule set forth in Korematsu v. United
States,23 the use of race-based classifications is considered suspect by the
Court, and triggers the application of the strict scrutiny test to evaluate
compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.24 Notwithstanding the
benign25 nature of a classification, the Court noted that "[t]he guarantees
of equal protection . . 'are universal in their application, to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of
.

20. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U S
. . 265, 312 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
21. See id. at 277.
22 . See id.
23. 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("[A)ll legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single
racial group are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutio nal .
It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.").
24. See id.; :see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 289-90 (opinion of Powell, J.).
25. Justice Powell rejected the University's argument that "discrimination against members of
the white 'majority' cannot be suspect if its purpose can be characterized as 'benign."' Id. at 294.
The basis for this rejection was multifaceted. First, Justice Powell dismissed the premise that the
guarantee of equal protection of the laws can have a different applicatio
n depending on the racial or
ethnic group alleging �isc� imination . See id. at 295. Such a practice
would, according to Justice
.
Powell, create an art1fic1al . two-class theory" that is repugnant
to the fundamental purpose underlying
the Fourteenth Amendment Id. Second, there would be definitio
nal and administrative problems
assoc�ated wi� "varying the �eve I o judici� review accordin
g
to
a
perceived 'preferred• status of
.
. mt�onty
a particular racial or ethmc
. Id. Fmally, the Court questioned the "benign" nature of any
.
preference because "[n]othmg m the Constitution support
s the notion that individuals may be as ked
to suffer otherwise impennissible burdens in order to
enhance the societal standing of their ethnic
groups." Id. at 298 .

:,
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race, of color, or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a
'6
pledge of the protection of equal laws. " 2
In order to justify the use of a race-based classification, the strict
scrutiny test demands a ''judicial detennination that the burden [borne] on
that basis is precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental
interest."27
The University proffered several justifications for the
program, including "improving the delivery of health-care services to
communities currently underserved,"21 attaining "a diverse student
body,"29

26.
27.

"countering the effects

of societal discr:mination,"30 and

Id. at 293 (quoting Vick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 3S6, 369 (1886)).

Id. at 299. The Court also stated that "in 'order to justify the usc of a suspect classification,

a State must show that its purpose or interest is both constitutionally pennissiblc and substantial, and

that its use of the classification is "necessary . . . to the accomplishment" of its purpose or the

safeguarding of its interest."' Id. at 305 (quoting In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973)).
28.

Id . at 310. Justice Powell rejected this argument because the University failed to establish

that the "special admissions program [was] either needed or geared to promote" the goal of
improving the delivery of health care services to underserved communities. Id.
29. Id. at 311.
30.

Id. at 306. The Court rejected this justification because remedial programs, such as the one

used by the University, could not justify the usc of race-based criteria "in the absence of judicial,

legislative, or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory violations." Id. at 307. Justice

Powell concluded that to hold otherwise "imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent, who
bear no responsibility for whatever hann the beneficiaries of the special admissions program arc
thought to have suffered." Id. at 310.

Professor Charles R. Lawrence Ill, criticizes Justice Powell's position, arguing that by defining

diversity within the paradigm of First Amendment jurisprudence, we arc forced to ignore the remedial
nature of affinnative action programs. See Charles R. Lawrence Ill, Each Othe r's Ha rvest:

Diversity's Deepe r Mea ning, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 757, 766-68 (1997). This construct, he asserts, docs
not further the true goal of diversity-the elimination of racism and subordination-but only serves

to "maintain the status quo and [protect] the power of those who
777. He states that

arc

currently privileged." Id. at

[t]his argument constitutionalizes the po wer of a privileged educational establishment to

detenninc what learning shall be valued and who shall be

taught

University faculties,

administrations, and boards of trustees continue to be dominated by white males. Under Justice

Powell's analysis, these white males have a constitutional right to detennine, based on ideas and

values widely shared by that privileged group, who will gain access to knowledge and power.

Thus, a racially diverse student body is a compelling interest for only as long as those who run

the school think it so. Powell's reasoning could as easily justify an all white school as one that
is racially dive rse.

Id. at 770-71 .

As discussed i n Part

IV below, I agree w i t h Professor Lawrence that there certainly i s a possibility

that racial or ethnic minorities could be excluded from a revised and exclusionary definition of
diversity. See infra Part IV. However, in light of the impact of Hopwoodv. Te xas, 18 FJd 932 (5th

Cir. 1996), ce rt. de nied, SIS U.S. 1033 (1996), and Proposition 209,_ see CAL. CONST. ART. I,
31(a)1 we must recognize that in the absence of constitutionally pennissible justifications for the

§

use

of race-bas e d selection criteria, minorities will be excluded from educational opportunities. We will
not only be "in danger of losing sight" of affinnative action's "true purpose: anti-racism," we will
be faced with the more immediate danger o f a return to the days of Swea t t v. Pa inte r, 339 U.S. 629
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"reducing the historic deficit of traditionally disfavored minorities in
medical schools and in the medical profession."31
Justice Powell determined that the University's only constitutionally
permissible goal was the attainment of a diverse student body.32 He
viewed the attainment of a diverse student body as an academic decision
deserving of judicial deference because it fell within the University's
right to academic freedom.33 Justice Powell noted that "(t]he freedom of
a university to make its own judgments as to education includes the
selection of its student body."34 As a result, the Court permitted the

( 1 9 50), and Mclaurin

v.

Oklahoma State Regents for Higher &iucation,. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).

Lawrence, supra, at 772. In fact, the Supreme Court already has rejected the use of race-based
affinnative action

as

a means of remedying past societal discrimination or curing the continuing

effects of racism within American society. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.

200, 227 (1995) (holding that all governmental classifications based on race are subject to strict
scrutiny); Richmond v. J.A.Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493-94 ( 1 988) (holding that the standard of
review

for racial

classifications

should be strict scrutiny); Regents of the Univ. of Cal.

v. Bakke, 438

U.S. 265, 291 (1978) (opinion of Powell J.) ("[R]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are
inherently suspect and thus call for the most exacting judicial examinations."). As a result, we are
left with the slender thread of Justice Powell's First Amendment argument. It is important that we
develop the definition of diversity within that argument if Ba/cke is to have relevance in the future.

3 1 . Balck£, 438 U.S. at 306. The Court rejected this justification as facially invalid because
"[p]referring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is
discrimination for its own sake."

32.

See id. at 31 1 - 1 2.

Id. at 307.

In his biography of Justice Powell, John C. Jeffries, Jr., discusses the

origins of the Balck£ opinion and the conflict that led to Justice Powell's reconciling the use of race
based preferences with the guarantees of the Equal Protection Clause. See JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR., AND1HE ERA OF JUDICIAL BALANCE 475-76 (1994). Jeffries gained
insight from Bob Comfort, Justice Powell's law clerk, who contributed research and insight on the

Bakke opinion. In discussing the constitutional permissibility of diversity as a compelling state
interest, Jeffries notes that
[a]s a justification for minority preferences, Comfort argued, diversity was better than
compensation-better, because more limited. Compensation implied that all groups hurt
in the past could now claim offsetting preferences. Diversity reached only those who
currently remained unrepresented. Diversity cut against affinnative action for Asians or
others who had made i t on their own. Also, Comfort favored diversity because o f the
flexible way that such concerns traditionally had been dealt with: "When Harvard College
receives applications from Idaho farmboys, it does not establish a separate admissions
track for them. It does not insulate them from comparison with other applicants and

guarantee them a number of safe seats. Instead, it takes the fact of geographical origin
as one factor weighing in the farmboy's favor when he is compared against all other

applicants. .." Race should be handled the same way. Since
race was "simpl y one
ingredi�nt of e ucational diversity," it was "unnecessary
to isolate racial minorities from
companson wtth other applicants." This, said Comfort,
was the crucial defect in the
Dav prog
. It was not that Allen Bakke fell short when
compared to the minority
admtttces. Rather, Bakke was not compared with
them at all."
.

�

Id.

33.
34.

�

�

See Balck£, 438 U.S. at 3 1 1 - 12.
Id. at 312.
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University, as a separate autonomous entity, to rely on countervailing
First Amendment guarantees of academic freedom to protect its right to
make admissions decisions.35 Justice Powell stated that "[a]cademic
freedom, though not a specifically enumerated constitutional right, long
has been viewed as a special concern of the First Amendment."36 Citing

35.

See id. at 313. For a criticism of this view, see Sheila Foster, Difference and Equality: A

Professor Foster
criticizes Justice Powell's reliance on the First A mendment as justification for the use of race-based
criteria within the context of a "speech paradigm," which she defines as ..whether First Amendment
values are sufficiently promoted by the policies to justify the affirmative inclusion of historically
excluded individuals." id. at 121. She argues that this framework is flawed because it "ignores the
broader equality concerns underlying the e nactment of the policy at issue in that [Bakke] case." id.
at 122. A s further explanation for her position, she notes:
Powell could find no principled way, under a speech paradigm, that an institution could
value one person's viewpoints or ideas over another person's viewpoints or ideas.
Diversity, under a speech paradigm, is purely forward-looking in that the exclusive goal
is to multiply the variety of viewpoints and ideas brought into an institutional setting.
Unlike the traditional equality paradig m [ which is defined as "whether past inequities, and
their present effects, justify affirmative attention to differences such as race in the
distribution of societal benefits and burdens"], a speech paradigm fails to acknowledge
the social context in which differences, and viewpoints, exist. Hence, it docs not take into
account past inequities toward certain differences, and their present effects on persons pos·
sessing those differences, and thus on their viewpoints. Thus, a speech paradigm cannot
justify differential treatment on the basis of characteristics such as race in distributing
scarce social goods.
id. Professor Foster favors the alternative analysis set forth by the majority opinion in Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547 (1990), which also used First Amendment principles to
justify the need for diversity. Professor Foster argues:
The majority, under the equality paradigm predominant in its other equal protection cases,
retained its focus on historical inequities, and their present effects, in concluding that
diversity was a sufficient justification for the race-conscious FCC policies at issue. What
was clearly of paramount importance i n justifying the FCC policies in Metro Broadcasting
was that minority beneficiaries of the policies, and hence their viewpoints, were signifi
cantly under-represented because of historical exclusion of minorities in the broadcasting
industry .
Foster, supra, at 123.
36. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 312. In his examination ofJustice Powell's Bakke opinion, Professor
Carl Cohen rejects the criticism that Justice Powell was either "naive" or "confused" in his
recognition of the importance of diversity in the admissions process for professional school students.
Carl Cohen, Equality, Diversity, and Good Faith, 26 WAYNE L. REV. 1261, 1272 (1980). Professor
Cohen writes:
[Justic e P owell] is fully aware that the need for diversity may vary with context. He
believe s-and as former President of the American Bar Association he can be said to have
some understanding of the needs of the professional schools-that diversity of students
in the class is a desideratum as important in medical and legal education as in the liberal
arts. Reasonable persons may differ o n this question. Powell's point, however, is that
if race is to be a factor in professional school admissions it may be a factor for no other
reas ons.
Critical Assessment of the Concept of "Diversity," 1993 WIS. L. REV. 105.

Id.
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Justice Frankfurter's four essential freedoms from Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 31 Justice Powell emphasized that "(t]he atmosphere of
'speculation, experiment and creation'-so essential to the q uality of
higher education-is widely believed to be promoted by a diverse student
body."3 8
The troublesome aspect of this reasoning is that it fails to set forth the
analytic paradigm relied upon by Justice Powell to develop a nexus
between diversity and traditional definitions of academic freedom.
Specifically, Justice Powell merely cites Key ishian v. Board of Regents39
for the proposition that diversity serves an academic interest because "the
'nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide exposure' to
the ideas and mores of students as diverse as this Nation of many
peoples.'>4° Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke does not offer any
additional guidance.4 1 Instead, it cautions that this discretion is not
absolute, but must yield to "constitutional limitations protecting individual
rights.'>42

3 7. 3 54 U.S. 234 ( 1 9 57). The four essential freedoms of a university are the right "to
detennine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught,
and who may be admitted to study." Id at 2 63 (Frankfurter, J.concurring) (citation omitted).
3 8. Bakke, 43 8 U.S. at 3 1 2. Neil L. Rudenstine, President of Harvard University, notes that
Justice Powell's views on diversity are consistent with Harvard's historical commitment to this issue
as evidenced by the philosophical positions of o
J hn Stuart Mill and past Harvard President Charles

Eliot. See NEIL L. RUDENSTINE, HARVARD UNIV., THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT 1 993 -199 5:
"DIVERSITY AND LEARNING," at 39 (19 95) (commenting on the importance of preserving diverse
educational opportunities). Rudenstine states:
In the course of Justice Powell's exposition, one can hear echoes of Mill's insistence on
"robust" exchanges, or Eliot's commitment to educating future leaders of a heterogenous
democratic society. Indeed, Justice Powell's pivotal opinion in Bakke has its roots in a
long tradition of thought ...[that] preceded, by more than a century, the advent of
affinnative action programs and the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 19 64 . It is a
tradition that is still vital, and still crucial to our nation's future.
Id.
39.
40.
41.

385 U.S. 589 ( 1 966).

Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 1 2 -13 (quoting Keyishian, 3 85 U.S.at 603).
P fessor 1. Peter Byrne notes that Justice Powell failed to articulate a justific ation for the

�

use of the First Amendment to insulate administrative activities somewhat removed from tea ching
and scholarship from the scrutiny of the Equal Protectio n Clause. See I. Peter Byrne, Academic
Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99
YALE L.J.2 51, 2 57 ( 1 9 89 ).
42 . Bakke, 438 U.S.at 3 14.
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The origins of institutional autonomy are found in the Supreme Court' s
broad interpretation and application of the academic freedom doctrine.'43
The S upreme Court's decisions in Sweezy v. New Hamrshire,.,. more
specifically, Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion,'' and later in
Keyishian v. Board of Regents'6 serve as the foundation upon which the
constitutional guarantee of institutional autonomy i s constructed.47 In

43.

The concept of academic freedom has varying definitions and interpretations. See generally

Ralph F. Fuchs, Academic Freedom-Its Basic Philosophy, Functio n, and History, 28 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 43 1 , 431 (1 963).

Fuchs states:

Academic freedom is that freedom of members of the academic community, assembled
in colleges and universities, which underlies the effective performance of their functions

of teaching, learning, practice of the arts, and research. The right to academic freedom

is recognized in order to enable faculty members and students to carry on their roles.
Id.; see also Estelle A. Fishbein, New Strings on the Ivory Tower:

The Growth ofAccountability in

Colleges and Universities, 12 J.C. &. U.L. 3 81 , 382 (198S). Fishbein states:

Traditionally, academic institutions were relatively free of outside constraints in managing
their internal affairs. Decisions regarding who to hire and fire, who to promote, who to

admit as students, which research to pursue and under what conditions, were matters left

wholly to the discretion of trustees, administrators, and faculties. The management of an
institution's internal affairs was jealously guarded and, in large measure, insulated from

legislative and even judicial intrusion by the halo of "academic freedom." There is no
single, universally accepted definition of"academic freedom" but the following admirably
captures the concept:
"Academic freedom is that aspect of intellectual liberty concerned with the peculiar
institutional needs of the academic community. The claim that scholars are entitled to
particular immunity from ideological coercion is premised on a conception of the
university as a community of scholars engaged in the pursuit of knowledge, collectively
and individually, both within the classroom and without, and on the pragmatic
conviction that the invaluable service rendered by the university to society can be
performed only in an atmosphere entirely free from administrative, political, or ecclesi
astical constraints on thought and expression."
Id. (footnote omitted).
useful:

The following definition of academic freedom by Professor Chen is also

When properly entrusted to thinkers rather than administrators, academic freedom fuels
the discovery of truth "out of a multitude of tongues, rather than through any kind of
authoritative selection." Defenders of educational affinnative action

are

likely to dispute

this account of academic freedom. From their perspective, academic freedom lies not in
the expressive liberty of individual professors and students, but in the university's ability
to implement affinnative action without fear of judicial review.

See Chen, supra note 15, 1 874 (citations omitted).
44. 3 5 4 U.S. 23 4 ( 1957).
45. See id. at 255 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
46.
47.

3 85 U.S. 589 (1 967).

See Me tzger, Profession and Constitution, supra note 19, at 1 3 15 (arguing that the origins
of institutional autonomy predate the Sweezy decision).
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both cases, the Court detennined the extent that an individual faculty
member, not an institution, may utilize the F irst Amendment's protection
In both opinions, however, the Justices also
of academic freedom.
discussed the broader implications of applying the academic freedom
doctrine to the entire educational sphere. 48
In Sweezy, the Supreme Court found the New Hampshire Attorney
General's exercise of his authority to compel Paul Sweezy to disclose his
knowledge of subversive activities violative of Sweezy's due process
rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.49 Sweezy, who had on several
occasions delivered lectures to humanities classes at the University of
New Hampshire,so refused to cooperate with the Attorney General 's
investigation of subversive activities, citing infringement of his First
Amendment rights.s1 In response, the Attorney General utilized the
assistance of the state Superior Court, which was authorized to "find
recalcitrant witnesses in contempt of court."s2 The court found Sweezy
in contempt and jailed him for refusing to disclose the requested
information.s3 The Supreme Court, however, held that the Attorney
General's activities were not related to any state interest that would
warrant interference with Sweezy's due process rights.54
This decision, issued by Chief Justice Warren, was the Court's first
extension of the constitutional protection of the First Amendment to
Chief Justice Warren concluded that "there
academic freedom.ss
unquestionably was an invasion of [Sweezy's] liberties in the areas of
academic freedom and political expression-areas in which government

48. See also Justice Douglas's statement in Griswold11. Connecticut, in which he interpreted the
First Amendment to include protection for academic freedom:
In other words, the State may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment,
contract the spectrum of available knowledge. The righ t of freedom ofspeech and press
includes not only the right to utter or to print, but the right to distribute, the right to
receive, the right to read and freedom of inquiry, freedom of thought, and freedom to
teach-indeed the freedom ofthe entire university community. Without those peripheral
rights the specific rights would be less secure.
3 8 1 U.S. 479, 482-83 (1%5) (citations omitted).
49. Sweezy, 3S4 U.S. at 2S3-S4.
SO.

See id. at 234.

Specifically, Sweezy refused to "disclose his knowledge of the Progressive Party i n New
Hampshire or of persons with whom he was acquainted in that organization." Id. at 24 1 -42.
51.

S2.

Id. at 238.

at 244-45.
at 2S4.
Al�?gh Chief Justice Warren did not expressly refer to the First Amendment when
.
discussmg
th15 ISSue, he recognized that Sweezy's rights to be free from invasions of his liberties "in
the areas ofacademic freedom and political expression" were "safeguar
ded by the Bill of Rights and
the Fourteenth Amendment" Id. at 250.
SJ.

See id.

S4.
SS

See id.

. .
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should be extremely reticent to tread. "56 He examined the parameters of
the protection afforded by academic freedom further when he explained
that
[t]he essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is
almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy
that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait
jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would
imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly
comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly
is that true in the social sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as
absolutes. Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and
distrust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and
to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization
will stagnate and die.H

In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter echoed the Chief
Justice ' s arguments on this issue, and added that additional constitutional
protection should be afforded to Sweezy as a member of the academic
community.58
This opinion focused on the detrimental effects of
governmental intervention into this unique area o f society.59 Justice
Frankfurter noted that a free society depends on free universities:60 "This
means the exclusion of governmental intervention in the intellectual life
of a university.''61 Justice Frankfurter further cited with approval the
language of a South African remonstrance policy identifying ''the four
essential freedoms" necessary to foster an academic atmosphere "most
conducive to speculation, experiment and creation. •'62 The now oft-cited
language p rovides that a university must have the authority "to detennine
for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how
it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study. •'63 It is important
to note, however, that this authority is not absolute.64
In 1967, the United States Supreme Court was asked once again to
interpret the legitimacy of a state's attempt to root out subversive activity
within a n academic community. In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 65
several faculty members at the State University of New York refused to

56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

See id. at 26 1 -63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
See id. at 262.

59.
60.
61.

See id.

Id. ("It matters little whether such intervention occurs avowedly o r through action that
inevitably tends to check the ardor and fearlessness of scholars, qualities at once so fragile and so
indispensable for fruitful academic labor.").
62. Id. at 263.
63.

Id.

64.

See infra Part IV.

65.

385 U .S . 589 (1967).
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sign certificates attesting that they were not Communists.66 As a result
of their subsequent dismissal, the faculty members sought declaratory and
injunctive relief citing various federal constitutional violations.67 The
Supreme Court found the statutory certification requirement unconstitu
tionally vague and not narrowly tailored.68 A lthough the Court recog
n ized the state's compelling interest in "keeping subvers ives out of the
teaching ranks,"69 the Court noted that the interests of faculty m embers
in preserving their right to academic freedom as protected by the F irst
Amendment also must be considered.70
Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom, which is of
transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That
freedom is therefore a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not
tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. "The vigilant
protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the
community ofAmerican schools." The classroom is peculiarly the "marketplace
of ideas." The Nation's future depends upon leaders trained through wide
exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth "out of a
multitude oftongues, (rather) than through any kind ofauthoritative selection."71

There are dicta from the Supreme Court' s decisions in Sweezy and
Keyishian suggesting that the guarantee o f academic freedom is not

More importantly, these
limited to faculty members and students .
decisions indicate the Court's willingness to expand this protection to
other areas of the educational arena. 72 By protecting the integrity of the
classroom, the Supreme Court acknowledged that some areas o f society
must not be subjected to excessive governmental interference in order to
ensure that they function properly and achieve their goals.
Sweezy, Keyishian, and Bakke provide the framework for developing
the doctrine of institutional autonomy. A m ajority of the Supreme Court,
however, has yet to adopt this doctrine into established First Amendment

66.

See id. at 592.

67.

The Feinberg law provided procedures for the removal or disqualification of individuals in
the public school system for engaging in subversive conduct See id. at 594-95.
68.

See id. at 597-99.

69.

Id. at 602.

70.

See id.

71.

Id. (citation omitted).

at 603.

72. See ROBERT K. POCH, ACADEMIC FREEOOM IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: RIGHTS,
REsPONSIBILITIES AND LIMITATIONS, 1993 ASHE-ERIC HIGHER EDUCATION REPORT NO. 4 (1993).
Poch notes that in addition to recognizing the academic rights of faculty,
the courts recognize also the rights of colleges and universitie to
set and maintain
s
pedagogical standards, see that appropriate course subject matter
is taught by the faculty,
and ensure that faculty are not engaged in the use of unprotecte
d speech in the classroom.
.
classroom is
the arena where institutional authority is greatest and courts are most
hesitant to enter.

Th�

Id. at 29.

·

·

·
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jurisprudence.73 By the same token, the Court has not rejected it.
Professor J. Peter Byrne acknowledges that the doctrine of institutional
autonomy represents an "abrupt departure from the academic tradition of
academic freedom."74 But Professor Byrne also concludes that the
protection of institutional autonomy has become necessary in order to
respon d to "[s]ignificant changes in the social function of the university
and in its legal status. "75 In addition, permitting an educational institution
to function as an independent entity serves as recognition of the unique
level o f administrative and pedagogical expertise necessary to manage an
educational institution. Finally, expansion of the academic freedom in
this context is entirely cons istent with Chief Justice Warren's statement
in Sweezy that "[n]o field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by
man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. "76 The recognition that
educational institutions are entitled to constitutional protection for
academic decision-making is a much needed judicial discovery.
2.

Judicial Recognition of Institutional Autonomy

a.

Administrative Decisions

The aforementioned decisions do not stand alone in their willingness
to expand First Amendment protections to educational institutions. These
decisions, and several Supreme Court and lower court decisions,
recogn ize the doctrine of institutional autonomy in a variety of adminis
trative and academic contexts. For example, with respect to administra
tive decisions, Justice Stevens, concurring with the Supreme Court's
decision in Widmar v. Vincent, 77 noted that judgments regarding the

73.
74.

See generally Rabban, supra note 19 .
Byrne, supra note 41, at 312 . Byrne states:

The Court's new elaboration of institutional academic freedom does contain anomalies.
The First Amendment rarely protects institutional decision-making so indirectly related

to expression as student admissions or faculty hiring. It may be hard to identify what
speech (or even point of view) the university expresses as an institution, distinct from
those of individual faculty, students, or administrators.

Moreover, while the right to

institutional academic freedom has risen at the time in our history when universities have
been most subject to federal regulation, no federal regulation has been invalidated under

the right. As in Sweezy and Keyishian, the new tum in academic freedom has flowered
in dicta and rhetoric more than in holdings and rules.

Id.

75.
76.
77.

Id.
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957).

454 U.S. 263, 277-81 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens stated:

In this case, I agree with the Court that the university has not established a sufficient
justification for its refusal to allow the Cornerstone group to engage in religious worship
on the campus. The primary reason advanced for the discriminatory treatment is the
University's fear of violating the Establishment Clause. But since the record discloses no
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allocati�n of a university's limited resources should be made "by
academicians, not by federal judges," w ithout courts subjecting the
institutions to the exacting scrutiny required for a showing of a "compel
ling state interest. "78
In Widmar, the Court was asked to determine whether the University
of Missouri at Kansas C ity, a state university, violated the First Amend
ment rights to freedom of speech and association of an evangelical
religious Christian student group by prohibiting the group's continued use
of University facilities for meetings.79 This case arose from the
University's interpretation of a regulation that "prohibit[ed] the use of
University buildings or grounds 'for purposes of religious worship or
religious teaching. rnao The University argued, pursuant to the regulation,
that giving the group access to its facilities would violate the Establish
ment Clause. 8 1 Applying the strict scrutiny test,12 Justice Powell initially
focused on the administrative nature of the University's regulation. 83 He
noted that the purpose of the University was to "provide a forum in
which students can exchange ideas."8• As such, the use of the forum for
religious spe;ch would neither advance nor inhibit the group's religious
activities.8 Further, he concluded that continued access to the Universi
ty's facilities would not contribute to "an excessive government entangle
ment with religion."86 As a result, Justice Powell concluded that the
University would not violate the Establishment Clause by giving the
group continued access to its facilities. 87

·

danger that the University will appear to sponsor any particular religion, and since student
participation in the Cornerstone meetings is entirel y voluntary, the Court properly
concludes that the University's fear is groundless.
Id. at 280-8 1.
78.

Id. at 279.

79.

See id. at 265.

80.

Id. at 265.

8 1 . See id. at 270-7 1 . Th e Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution provides that
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment o f religion."
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
82. See Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269-70.
·

In order to justify discriminatory exclusion from a public forum
based on the religious
content of a group's intended speech, the University must
therefore satisfy the standard
of review appropriate to content-based exclusions. It must
show that its regulation is
necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that
it is narrowly drawn to achieve that
end.

Id. (citation omitted).
83.

See id. at 270-75.

84.

Id. at 271 n.10.

85.
86.

See id. at 271 -72 n. 1 0.

87.

Id. at 271 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 6 1 2- 1 3 ( 1971) (citations omitted)).
See id.
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Justice Stevens concurred with the majority's decision in Widmar
because the University failed to offer any legitimate reasons why the use
of University facilities by a religious student group would trigger a
possible infringement of the Establishment Clause by the University;88
however, he clearly acknowledged that "every university must 'make
academic judgments as to how best to allocate scarce resources. "'89
Routine administrative decisions regarding ''the use of the time and space
that is available for extracurricular activities" should be insulated from
the Court's exacting scrutiny.90
b.

Academic Decisions

With respect to decisions made in an academic context, there is a
growing line of cases evidencing the judiciary's willingness to apply the
standard adopted by the Court in Regents of the University of Michigan
v. Ewing,91 and thus to defer to the decision-making authority of

88.

See id. at 280-81 (Stevens, J., concurring). Professor William W. Van Alstyne writes:

A concurring opinion in Widmar by Justice Stevens makes a point not in disagreement
with Powell's majority opinion, but qualifying it in a manner anticipating his own applied
usage of "academic freedom" in Ewing.

Stevens expressly referred to "academic

freedom" to disallow intrusive judicial review of institutional procedures for handling
disputes in allocating university space. In Stevens' view, the first amendment may shelter
on-campus free speech and meeting rights of students at public institutions. Even so, he
insisted, where such groups seek use of facilities, the first amendment does not require
suspension of institutional opinion respecting their relative academic worthiness-at least
in mediating competing demands, if not in judging their general "right" to be on campus.
Rather, the first amendment specifically protects academic value judgments reflected in
institutional mechanisms established to determine priorities of use where not all requests
can simultaneously be granted. In Stevens' view, institutional discretion of this sort is not
different in kind than the sort Powell embraced for the Court in the Bakke case. It is
correspondingly entitled to a strong measure of academic freedom respect in the courts.
Van A l styne, supra note 19, at 142.

89.
90.
91.

Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277 (Stevens, J., concurring) (quoting the majority opinion).
Id. at 278.

474 U.S. 214 (1985).
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educational institutions.92 Although not absolute, judicial deference has
been afforded in two limited contexts.
First, in cases challenging admissions and retention decisions, courts
have expressed a reluctance· to interfere with academic decisions made by
a university.93 Ewing is the seminal case on this issue. In Ewing, the
p laintiffs primary complaint was that the University arbitrarily evaluated
his academic credentials when determining his fitness to remain in
school.94 The plaintiff, Ewing, alleged that h e had a property interest in
continued enrollment in the medical school, and that the University , s
,
decision to dismiss him violated his "'substantive due process rights
The Supreme Court
guaranteed by the Fourteenth AmendmenC,gs
concluded that even i f the plaintiff had a protectible property interest in
continued enrollment in medical school, the Court was reluctant to
interfere with the University's decision to dismiss him from its accelerat
ed program.96 Because Ewing alleged an infringement of a constitutional
ly protected interest, however the Court evaluated the University's
,
conduct to determine if Ewing , s dismissal was the product of "arbitrary
state action.',g7 The Court's decision was based on a number of factors ,
including a finding that Ewing's dismissal was not the result of arbitrari
ness, but in fact was the product of conscientious and careful delibera
tions by the faculty "based on an evaluation of the entirety of Ewing's

92. Byrne, supra note 41, at 326-27. Byrne states that
[t]he constitutional right of institutional academic freedom appears to be a collateral
descendent of the common law notion of academic abstention. This heritage is made
explicit in Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, where the Court, after
invoking Horowitz and the rhetoric of abstention, suggests that these views recommend
themselves as protection for academic freedom. And the "four freedoms" of Sweezy
reflect the kinds of university decisions courts have refused to review under common law
principles. Institutional academic freedom can be viewed as academic abstention raised
to constitutional status, so that judges can consider whether statutes or regulations fail to
give sufficient consideration to the special needs or prerogatives of the academic com
munity.
Id.

93. See, e.g., Van de Zilver v. Rutgers Univ., 971 F. Supp. 925 (D.N.J. 1997); Phelps v.
Washburn Univ., 634 F . Supp. 556 (D. Kan.1986); Montana v. Pantzer 489 P.2d 375 (Mont. 1 97 1 ).
This position is consistent with Justice Powell's concurring opinion in B rd ofCurators v. Horowitz,
435 U.S. 78, 96 n.6 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) ("University faculties must have the widest range
of discretion in making judgments as to the academic performance of students and their entitlement
to promotion or graduation.").
94. 474 U.S. at 225.
95. Id. at 217.
96. See id. at 225-28; see also Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90 ("Like
the decision of an ind ividual
professor as to the �roper grade for a student in his course, th e determinat
ion whether to dismiss a
stud�nt for academic reasons requires an expert evaluatio n
of cumulative infonnation and is not
readtly adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or admin
istrative decisionmaking.").
97. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 224-25.

�
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academic career."98 Such academic decision-making was insulated from
judicial scrutiny because o f two considerations. F irst, the Court deferred
to the faculty's exercise of its "professional judgment. "99 Justice Stevens
concluded that in the absence of "a substantial departure from accepted
academic norms," judicial restraint should be exercised in these matters. 100
Second, Justice Stevens, citing Sweezy, Keyishian, and Bakke, acknowl
edged the Court's reluctanc e to substitute its judgment for the educational
expertise utilized in the academic decision-making process. 10 1
He
acknowledged

a reluctance to trench on the prerogatives of state and local educational
institutions and our responsibility to safeguard their academic freedom, "a
special concern of the First Amendment." If a "federal court is not the
appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personal decisions that
are made daily by public agencies" far less is it suited to evaluate the substance
of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members
of public educational institutions-decisions that require an expert evaluation
o f cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools
o f judicial or administrative decision-making. 102
In addition to Supreme Court decisions, lower federal courts also have
recognized the doctrine of institutional autonomy and the importance o f
an educational institution's right to exercise its First Amendment rights
in the selection of its student body. In Martin v. Helstad, 1 03 the District
Court o f Wisconsin, citing Bakke and Sweezy, held that "[a]cademic
institutions are accorded great deference in their freedom to determine
who m ay be admitted to study at the institution. As long as admission
standards remain within constitutionally permissible parameters, it is

98. Id. at 225.
99. Id.
1 00. Id.
1 0 1 . See id. at 226. Justice Stevens concluded that "[a)cademic freedom thrives not only on the
independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students but also, and somewhat
inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself." Id. at 226 n.12 (citation
omitted). But see Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: 0 Say,
Does That Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet Wave?, 40 WAYNE L. REv. I, 1 7 (1993).
Professor Heirs argues that "[w)hen Justice Stevens used the expression 'autonomous decision-making
by the academy itself,' he was obviously referring to decision-making by the faculty." Id. He further
argues that with respect to conflicting rights of the faculty and the university, "[t)he notion that
academic institutions are somehow endowed with an 'academic freedom' to restrict or punish the
exercise of academic freedom by their faculty is aberrant." Id. at 5 5 .
102. Ewing, 414 U.S. at 226 (alteration i n original) (citations omitted). In a concurring opinion,
Justice Powell echoed the Court's "emphasis on the respect and deference that courts should accord
academic decisions made by the appropriate university authorities." Id. at 230 (Powell, J.,
concurring). He went on to conclude that "[j)udicial review of academic decisions, including those
with respect to the admission or dismissal ofstudents, is rarely appropriate, particularly where orderly
administrative procedures are followed." Id.
103 . 578 F. Supp. 1473 (W.D. Wis. 1983).
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exclusively within the province of higher educational institutions to
establish criteria for admission."104
In Martin, the University of Wisconsin had revoked the acceptance of
an applicant who was convicted and incarcerated for interstate transporta
ios
Although required to do so the app l icant had
tion of forged securities.
,
failed to include this infonnation about his criminal conviction on his
6
application to law school.10 The plaintiff challenged the revocation as
a violation of his due process and equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment.107 The court, however, recognized that the
University's academic freedom to select its student body diminished any
private property interest that Martin had in attending law school and
granted the University of Wisconsin School of Law's motion for
summary judgment. 1 08
Federal courts also have evidenced a willingness to defer to the
decision-making authority of academic institutions in the area of
discrimination claims based on disability. 109 For example in Anderson
,
v. University of Wisconsin, 1 10 an alcoholic law student challenged the
University of Wisconsin Law School's decision not to readmit him for a
fourth time. 1 11 Anderson alleged that the University dismissed him
because of his alcoholism in violation of section 504 of the Rehabil itation

104.
105.
1 06.
107.
108.
551

Id. at 1482 (citations omitted).

See id. at 1478.

See id. at 1475-76.

See id.

See id. at 1485; see also Wirsing v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Colo., 739 F. Supp.

(D. Colo.

1990). In Wirsing, the court held that requiring a tenured professor to comply with

the University of Colorado at Denver's requirement that she administer standardized teaching
evaluations in her classes did not interfere with her right to academic freedom under the First

Amendment. Id. at 553-54.

Instead, the court noted the countervailing institutional autonomy

enjoyed by the University to govern the institution. See id. at 553. "Because the university must
remain independent and autonomous to enjoy academic freedom, the federal courts are reluctant to

interfere in the internal daily operations of the academy which do not directly and sharply implicate
basic constitutional values." Id.
109. See Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. o f Va., 967 F. Supp. 882, 886
1997).

(W.D.

Va.

The first of these is a court's limited ability, as contrasted to that of experienced
educational administrators and professionals, to determine an applicant's qualifications and

whether he or she would meet reasonable standards for academic and professional
achievement established by a university . . . . "Courts are
particularly ill-equipped to
evaluate academic performance."

Id. (quoting Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S.
78, 92 ( 1 978)) (omission
in original); see also Mallett v. Marquette Univ., 65 F.3d 1 70, 1995 WL 508104, at •3 (7th Cir.
199 ) unpublished opinio ) (fi ding that law school applicant
was not "otherwise qualified" for
adm1ss1on to Marquette University Law School notwithstandin
g his disability).
1 1 0. 841 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1988).

� �

1 1 1.

�

See id. at 739.

?
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Act. 1 1 2 The Rehabilitation Act provides that "an institution receiving
federal funds may not discriminate against an 'otherwise qualified
"
handicapped individual. ' 1 1 3 The district court granted the University's
motion for summary judgment upon concluding, as the University did,
that Anderson was "not 'otherwise qualified ' to continue as a law
student" because of his poor academic performance. 1 14
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit, in response to Anderson's argument
that a j ury should be allowed to reach the final disposition of the case,
noted that, consistent with the United States Supreme Court's decisions
in Ewing• 1 5 and Horowitz, 1 1 6 judicial deference was the more appropriate
response to this action. 1 1 7 Specifically, the Seventh C ircuit concluded that
[t]he Act does not designate a jury, rather than the faculty of the Law School,
the body to decide whether a would-be student is up to snuff. The Law
School may set standards for itself, and jurors unacquainted with the academic
program of a law school could not make the readmissions decision more
accurately than the faculty of the Law School; the process of litigation would
change the substantive standard in addition to raising the costs of its applica
tion.1 11
as

The S ixth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in Doherty v. Southern
College of Optometry. 1 19 In Doherty, the plaintiff, an optometry student,

suffered from a debilitating eye condition known as "retinitis pigmentosa
(RP) and an associated neurological condition. "120 In order to advance
into his fourth year of the program, the plaintiff was required to pass a
pathology clinic examination that required him to perform several manual
techniques with proscribed instrumentation. 1 2 1 Due to his physical
condition, the plaintiff was unable to successfully complete this examina
tion, and was therefore denied a degree.122 The S ixth C ircuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs discrimination claim because
the University could not "reasonably accommodate" his disability. 123
Additionally, in response to his breach of contract claims, the Sixth
Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's reasoning from Ewing and Horowitz

1 1 2.

See id.

1 1 3.

Id. at 740 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 794).

1 14.

Id.

v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 2 1 4 ( 1 985).

1 1 5.

Regents of the Univ. o f Mich.

1 1 6.

Board of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 89-9 1 (1978).

1 1 7.

See Anderson, 841 F.2d at 74 1 .
Id.

1 1 8.
1 1 9.
120.

862 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1988).

Id. at 572.

121.

See id.

122.
1 23.

See id. at 572-73.
Id. at 575.
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and expressed a reluctance to interfere with competency decisions made
by academic institutions. 1 24 The Sixth Circuit noted that

this case arises in an academic context where judicial intervention in any fonn
should be undertaken only with the greatest reluctance. The federal judiciary
is ill equipped to evaluate the proper emphasis and content of a school's
curriculum. This is the case especially regarding degree requirements in the
health care field when the conferral of a degree places the school's imprimatur
upon the student as qualified to pursue his chosen profession. m
The Sixth Circuit ultimately concluded that the University did not breach
any express or implied contractual agreements with the plaintiff, and
therefore set aside the district court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff
on this issue. 126
The second context in which federal courts have evidenced a willing
ness to defer to the decision-making authority of academic institutions is
with respect to faculty retention decisions. Although the Supreme Court
has broadly interpretea the scope of acade m ic freedom protections for
faculty and students, this is an area within the academy where institution
al autonomy reigns supreme over those fundamental First Amendment
rights. For example, the Sixth Circuit in Hetrick v. Martin121 held that
Eastern Kentucky University did not violate the First Amendment rights
of an untenured faculty member when the University failed to renew her
contract due to its "displeasure with her pedagogical attitudes."128 The
court held that the scope of a teacher' s right to academic freedom did not
"encompass the right of a nontenured teacher to have her teaching style
insulated from review by her superiors when they determine whether she
has merited tenured status just because her m ethods and philosophy are
considered acceptable somewhere within the teaching profession."129 The
Sixth Circuit, in accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Board
of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 130 concluded that in the absence of
a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right, a university has the
authority to terminate a nontenured faculty member without articulation
of a statement of reasons for such action, notice, or a hearing.13 1 The
court noted that a contrary decision would subject educational institutions
to legal action with "every nonrenewal decision." 1 32

I 24.
125.
1 26.
127.
128.

See id. at 576.

Id. (citations to Ewing and Horowitz omitted).
See id. at 579.
480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1973).

1 29.

Id. at 708.
Id. at 709.

130.

408 U.S. 564 ( 1 972).

131.

See Hetrick, 480 F .2d at 709 .

132.

Id.
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Similarly, the First Circuit i n Lovelace v. Southeastern Massachusetts
University133 held that the University did not interfere with an untenured
faculty member's academic freedom when it refused to renew his
contract. 134 The faculty member argued that the University retaliated
against him for his refusal to "inflate his grades or lower his expectations
and teaching standards."135 The First Circuit emphasized that the
University had a recognized right to govern the institution pursuant to the
"four essential freedoms"1 36 as set forth in Sweezy and Bakke, and that
such rights superseded any rights to academic freedom asserted by the
faculty member in this situation. 137 As a result, the University was
entitled to establish and implement policies regarding "course content,
homework load, and grad ing. " 138 It was also within the University's
discretion to determine whether it "sets itself up to attract and serve only
the best and brightest students or whether it instead gears its standard to
a broader, more average population. "139 In the absence of such institu
tional autonomy, the court concluded that the University would be
constrained from "defining and performing its educational mission."140
Even though a few circuits are outspoken on this issue, the doctrine of
institutional autonomy is in an embryonic state. The expansion of F irst
Amendment protection to academic decision-making, however, is
consistent with the deferential treatment afforded by the Supreme Court
to the ideas and conduct of individual members of the academic
community. Protection of this community as a "marketplace of ideas"
requires the Court to recognize the unique nature and complexity of this
environment. The foundation of academic decision-making is the
professional judgment and expertise utilized by its members. The
judiciary is ill-equipped to evaluate the merits of these informed
decisions. Judicial interference in this process would subject members of
the academic community to unwarranted litigation, and hamper their
ability to act in the best interests of their educational institutions.
Recognition of the doctrine of institutional autonomy ensures members
of the academy that their educational decision-making will be insulated
by the First Amendment from unwarranted constitutional scrutiny.

133. 793 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1986).
134. See id. at 426.
135. Id. at 425.
136. Id. at 426 (quoting Sweezey v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 ( 1957), as stating that
the "four essential freedoms" of a university are "to determine for itself on academic grounds who
may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study").
137. See id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 425·26.
140. Id. at 426.
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The Attainment of Diversity as a Permissible Exercise of
B.
Academic Freedom

The modem trend toward adoption of the "four essential freedoms"
identified in Sweezy was set forth by Justice Powell in Bakke. 1 41
Specifically, Justice Powell noted that "[t]h e freedom of a un iversity to
make its own judgments as to education includes the selection of its
student body."142 It is through this exercise of a free selection process
that Justice Powell detennined that the "attainment of a diverse student
body"143 was a constitutionally penn issible justification for the use of
race-based admissions criteria. 144
During the twenty-year period between the Bakke decision and the
Fifth Circuit's explicit rejection of Justice Powell's diversity justification
in Hopwood v. State of Texas, 145 two lower courts held that the use of
race-based preferences by educational institutions was constitutionally
permissible. In Davis v. Halpern, 146 the United States District C ourt for
the Eastern District of New York accepted as controlling precedent
Justice Powell's view that the use of racial preferences to achieve
diversity was a constitutionally pennissible goal capable of withstanding
the strict scrutiny analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment. 147 In Davis, a
white male applicant to the City University of New York (CUNY) law
school challenged the University's numerous rejections of his application

141.

Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 3 1 1 - 1 5 (1978) (opinion of Powell,

J.).
142.

Id. at 3 12.

143.

Id. at 3 1 1 .

144.

See id. at 3 1 1- 12. But see DARIEN A MCWHIRTER, THE END OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION:

WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 1 50 (1996). McWhirter states:
It is important to remember why Justice Powell allowed diversity to rule in the area of
college admission. It was not only to help minority students, although that was certainly
part of the equation. The stated purpose of diversity on state college campuses was to
provide a more diverse educational environment for everyone, minority and nonminority
alike. Given an Ivy League setting, the purpose of diversity is to ensure that white
students who never attended a school with blacks or Hispanics can observe them for a
Id.

while close up before they have to work with them out there in the real world.
145.

78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996); see a/Jo discussion supra notes J 84-97 and accompanying text.

146. 768 F. Supp. 968 (E.D.N.Y. 1991). Several federal and state
courts have adopted Justice
Powell's analysis in Bakke. See, e.g., Smith v. University of Wash.
Law Sch., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1 3 24,
1 334-35 (W.D. Wash. 1998); University and Community College
Sys. ofNev. v. Farmer, 93 0 P.2d
730, 734-35 (Nev. 1 997); DeRonde v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. 625 p.2d 220 224-2 5, 227 (Cal .
1981�
•

147.

See Davis, 768 F. Supp. at 975.

•
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as violations of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act o f 1 964. 1 48 The applicant
alleged that pursuant to the school's affinnative action policy, race and
gender were considered as factors in the admissions process. 149
The University asserted that these factors were used to recruit a
diversified student body. 150 Specifically, CUNY's Statement of Admis
sions Policy, which was set forth in the school's admissions catalogue,
provided that the University's goal was to "select a diverse group of
students, genuinely representative of the remarkable diversity of the City
the School serves."151 The d istrict court's decision in this case represents
one of the few instances in which a federal court fully adopted Justice
Powell's assertion that the attainment of a diverse student body can serve
as a compelling justification for the use of race-based criteria. The court,
citing Bakke, noted that
[w]hile the use of racial classifications are highly disfavored and have been
infrequently sustained by the Supreme Court, there arc instances in which
classifications serving proper purposes will be upheld. One such purpose is that
of a university's obtaining the benefits which flow from enrolling an ethnically

diverse student body.

is2

The court further recognized the existence of a nexus between the First
Amendment and diversity within an educational environment, but like
Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, it failed to fully explore the justifica
tions for such a connection. The Davis court merely recited Justice
Powell's conclusion that "the First Amendment interest in providing an
environment which fosters the 'robust exchange of ideas' makes the goal
of diversity 'of paramount importance in the fulfillment of [a universi
ty's] m ission."'m
The court noted that the University's use of racial preferences to
achieve diversity was consistent with the "Harvard Plan," approved by

148. Id. at 970; see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-4a (1994) "No person in the United
States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded ftom participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."). As interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in Bakke, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d prohibits any discriminatory conduct that also violates the equal protection guarantees
of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Ba/eke, 438 U.S. at 287 (opinion of Powell, .
J ).
149. See Davis, 768 F. Supp. at 974.
150. See id. at 980.
1 5 1 . Id.
1 52. Id. at 975.
However, Bakke makes clear that in the absence ofprior discrimination by the university
the consideration of race as one factor among many by a university admissions process
is constitutional only so far as it seeks to procure for the university the educational
benefits which flow from having a diverse student body.
Id. at 98 1 .
1 53. Id. at 975.

KANSAS LAW REVIEW

616

[Vol . 47

Justice Powell in Bakke. 1s4 Although an admiss ions policy that adopts
this structure may appropriately place "a premium on membership in
certain ethnic groups," and use this as "a perfectly appropriate, and legal,
means to achieve d iversity," such a policy violates the Equal Protection
C lause if it is used as a remedial measure in the absence of a "proper
showing of discrim ination."1s.s Although the tenor of this opinion is
clearly supportive of diversity within the academy, it is clear that the
court was hampered by the University's failure to justify its admissions
policy with rationales that are consistent with Justice Powell's definition
of d iversity. Instead, the district court concluded that
[t]he fact that the City and State are ethnically diverse, the fact that the Bar may
be too homogeneous,· or the fact that minorities too often may not be able to
find adequate legal representation cannot alone or in combination with one
another, without more, support the consideration of race by the law school. The
law school's remedial powers are limited, under the Equal Protection Clause,
to addressing such discrimination as it specifically finds to have been perpetuat
ed by its own institutions-not by our society at large. 156
I n addition to seeking a diversified student body, CUNY's race-based
admissions criteria also was viewed as a remedial measure to d iversify·
the New York bar due to underrepresentation of minorities, and to train
minority attorneys so that they would be available to assist underserved
minority communities. 157 The court, however, also made c lear that
remedial measures, even those aimed at achievement of diversity, must
be justified by a proper showing of past d iscrimination, and that no such
showing was made by the University in thi s case. 158 The court n oted that
ifthe University's policy was aimed at remedying societal discrim ination,
"then it is unconstitutional for its failure to be limited to the goal of
remedying specific prior discriminatory practices by the law school." 159
The court further determined that the University's admissions policy
unfortunately confused or merged ''the goal of diversity, whose intent

154.

See id . at 982.

155.

Davis, 768 F. Supp. at 982.

The Harvard Plan is a common reference to the special admissions plan
adopted by Harvard College. See Bakke, 438 U.S. 273 , app. at 322-23 (opinion of Powell J.).
,

Id. at 981.
See id. at 980. The University 's Director of Admissions stated
that
(b]ecause minorities and other groups are underrepresented in the legal profession and
because of the diverse composition of New York City and State and the Law School's
commitment to diversity in its student body, membership in underrepresented groups is
one of several factors, such as GPA and LSAT scores, which Committee members may
consider, in determining an applicant's request for admissio
n.

156.
157.

Id.

1 58. See id. at 980-81 ("Neither side in this case has proffered
a shred of evidence suggesting
that the law school has ever engaged in discrimination against those
underrepresented groups.").
159. Id. at 980.
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is to cultivate a richer academic environment, with that of the remedial
consideration of race and ethnicity, which [was imperm issibly] directed
at addressing the inadequate minority representation in the legal
6
profession." 1 0 As a result of the University's failure to present any
evidence of past discriminatory conduct that would 'justify a race
conscious remedy under Title VI," the district court determined that a
triable issue of fact remained regarding the constitutional permissibility
of the University's policies. 1 6 1
Another case that adopted the attainment of diversity as a constitution
ally permissible justification for the use of race-based preferences is
2
In McDonald, an unsuccessful white male
McDonald v. Hogness. 1 6
applicant challenged the admissions policies of the University o f
Washington School of Medicine on several constitutional and statutory
grounds. 1 63 The Medical School's admissions policy considered a number
of factors, including "academic performance, medical aptitude, motiva
tion, maturity, and demonstrated humanitarian qualities. Extenuating
background circumstances are considered as they relate to these selection
factors. " 1 64
The University considered race or ethnicity as a positive
65
factor in this process. 1
The University argued, i n accordance with Sweezy and Keyishian, that
the administration of its admissions policy was a constitutionally
permissible exercise of academic freedom as protected by the First
Amendment. 1 66 Although the court agreed that "a university must have
wide d iscretion in making admission judgments," such discretion must be
" 67
tempered by "'constitutional limitations protecting individual rights. '1
The constitutional limitation imposed by the Equal Protection C lause
mandates compliance with the strict scrutiny test when evaluating the

160. Id.
1 6 1 . Id. at 982-83.
162. 598 P.2d 707 (Wash. 1979) (en bane). Initially, the court noted that the applicant was not
entitled to relief on equal protection grounds because evidence showed that he would not have been
admitted into the "class even absent the six minority persons accepted and without any consideration
of race." Id. at 7 1 1.. Because of the "public importance of the issue and the likelihood of its
recurrence," however, the court considered the broader question of whether the use of race was a
constitutionally permissible admissions factor. Id.
163. See id. at 709 (restating the argument that the University engaged in racial discrimination
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, section 601 of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
1 64. Id.
1 65. Se e id. at 714.
166. The University relied on Justice Frankfurter's argument in Sweezy to argue that the denial
of the plaintiff's application "was an exercise of its constitutionally protected freedom to decide who
shall be admitted to study." Id. at 7 1 3 n.7.
167. Id. (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 314 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.)).
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1 1
In this regard, the
constinitionality of race-based selection criteria. 6
Washington Supreme C ourt adopted Justice Powell's conclusion that the
attainment of a diverse student body is a compelling justification for the
use of racial selection criteria. 1 69 The attainment of a diverse student
body was viewed by the court as a permissible method of promoting an
atmosphere of "speculation, experimentation and creation."170 The court
noted that "[i]n applying his test, Mr. Justice Powell characterizes the
goal of the attainment of a diverse student body as compel ling, stressing
that the freedom to select a student body is an element of academic
freedom." 1 7 1 Because the finding of fact that the University's purpose
underlying the use of the racial criteria as a means of promoting d iversity
in the student body172 was unchallenged by the applicant, 173 the Washing
ton Supreme Court held that the use of such criteria was in conformity
with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 174
In McDonald, the University's use of racial classifications is analogous
to the use of such c lassifications in Bakke. m In accordance with the
Supreme Court's interpretation of the strict scrutiny test, notwithstanding
the constitutionality of the purpose underlying the race-based classifica
tion, a court also may find a violation of the Equal Protection C lause if
the race-based classification is not "necessary to the accomplishment of
[the] purpose. " 176 This tailoring of the classification to fit its i ntended
purpose was clearly established in McDonald. The court noted the
similarities in administration between the University of Washi ngton' s
admissions program and the program cited with approval by Justice

168.

See id.

1 69.

See id.

170.

Id.

171.
1 72.

Id. at 712.

See id. at 713 n.7 (..We agree that in seeking diversity, the U.W. medical school must be

viewed 'as seeking to achieve a goal that is of paramount importance in the fulfillment of its
mission."').
173.
174.

See id. at 713 n.8.

See id. at 715. The court noted:

In dicta, Mr. Justice Powell indicates that the Harvard admission plan, which like the plan
here employs race as

an

admission factor, furthers a compelling state interest in diversity

of the student body. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun also found the
Harvard plan constitutional under their approach.

Thus, a majority of the court find

constitutional a plan without a quota or separate consideration for minority groups but
where race may be

a

beneficial factor.

The University of Washington School of

Medicine's admission policies and procedures have the same redeeming characteristics.
Id. at 7 1 3 (citations omitted).
175.

The McDonald court, citing Justice Powell's analysis of the race-based admissions criteria

in Bakke, noted that "a program under which race is but one factor in achieving diversity" would
survive the tailoring requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 714.
176. Id.
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Powell in Bakke. 1 77 The McDonald court, citing with approval Justice
Powel l ' s position, stated that
this diversity encompasses a broad array of qualifications and characteristics of
which racial origin is a single element. [Justice Powell] concludes from the
experience of other uni versity admission programs which take race into account
in achieving diversity that the assignment of a fixed number of places to a
minority group is not necessary. 1 71

The court believed that the University of Washington's admission plan
had the same redeeming characteristics as the Harvard Plan, ''which like
the p l an here employs race aS an admission factor, furthers a compelling
state interest in diversity of the student body." 1 79
To date, the strongest judicial opposition to the use of race-based
affirmative action programs to attain a diverse student body has come out
of the Fifth Circuit. In Hopwood v. Texas, 1 80 the Fifth Circuit prohibited
the University of Texas School of Law from using race or ethnicity as a
factor in the selection of applicants, effectively terminating the affirma
tive action program. 1 8 1 The court rejected the University's argument that
the goal of attaining a diverse student body was a compelling government
interest capable of satisfying the constitutional scrutiny imposed by the
Equal Protection Clause. 1 8 2 The Fifth Circuit was not persuaded by the
University's reliance on Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, 1 83 and in fact,

1 77.
1 78.

See id. at 713.

Id. (citation omitted).

1 79.

Id. at 7 1 3 .

1 80.

78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1 996). For a critical analysis of the Hopwood opinion, see Michael

A. Olivas, The Decision Is Flatly, Unequivocally Wrong, CHRON. HIGHER Eouc., Mar. 29, 1996, at
83.
181.

Note District Court Judge Sparks's prophetic remarks:

The Court believes such meager representation would be woefully inadequate in a state
university supported, in part, by revenues from all state residents.

Further, the Court

concurs with the defendants that diversity requires more than token representation of
minorities; strict reliance on the Tis for admission would not further the goal of diversity.
Hopwood, 861 F. Supp. 5 5 1 , 571 n.60 (W.D. Tex. 1994), rev 'd, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
1 82. See Hopwood, 78 F.3d at 944.
1 83.

The Fifth Circuit in Hopwood held:

We agree with the plaintiffs that any consideration of race or ethnicity by the law school
for the purpose of achieving a diverse student body is not a compelling interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment Justice Powell's argument in Bakke garnered only his own vote
and has never represented the view o f a majority ofthe Court in Bakke or any other case.
Moreover, subsequent Supreme Court decisions regarding education state that non

Id.

remedial state interests will never justify racial classifications.

Fifth Circuit Judge Wiener, however, disagreed with the majority's conclusion regarding this issue.
See id. at 962 (Wiener, J., concurring). Judge Wiener's rejection of the majority's opinion on this
issue was the result of three primary factors. First, he concluded that the Supreme Court's decision
in Adarand offered "minimal guidance" in detennining whether to apply the strict scrutiny test to
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specifically rejected it, stating: "Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not
binding precedent on this issue."184
The court in Hopwood addressed several problems associated with the
use of racial or ethnic classifications to attain a diverse student body.1 85
It initially expressed its reliance on the Supreme Court's decisions in City
of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Company116 and Adarand Constructors, Inc.
v. Pena, 187 and thus concluded that these cases serve as the basis for the
Supreme Court's mandate that the use of race-based preferences to
achieve diversity is not a compelling interest that can satisfy the strict

race-based classifications. Id at 964-65. Second, he argued that Hopwood could be decided on

narrower grounds without reaching the broader constitutional issues. See id. at 966. He noted that

the special admissions program utilized by the University was constitutionally invalid because it was

not narrowly tailored to achieve the goal of attaining a diverse student body. See id. Judge Wiener
wrote that the University's special admissions program "more closely resembles a set aside or quota
system for those two disadvantaged minorities [blacks and Hispanics] than it does an academic
admissions program narro wly tailored to achieve true diversity." Id.
1 84. Id. at 944. ("While [Justice Powell] announced the judgment, no other Justice joined in that
part of the opinion discussing the diversity rationale . . . . As the Adarand Court states, the Bakke

Court did not express a majority view and is questionable as binding precedent.").

Fifth Circuit

Judge Wiener recognized the premature nature of the majority's conclusion that Adarand overruled

Justice Powell's conclusion in Bakke that race was a constitutionally permissible means of achieving
diversity.

See

id.

at 963 (Wiener, J., concurring). On the contrary, Judge Wiener wrote that the

decision to overrule Bakke rests with the Supreme Court, and "not a three-judge panel o f a circuit
court." Id. He further argued:
This conclusion may well be a defensible extension of recent Supreme Court precedent
[Adarand], an extension which in time may prove to be the Court's position.

It

admittedly has a simplifying appeal as an easily applied, bright-line rule proscribing any
use of race as a determinant Be that as it may, this position remains as extension o f the
law-one that, in my opinion, is both overly broad and unnecessary to the disposition of
this case.
Id. (emphasis omitted); see also Michael Olivas, Constitutional Criteria: The Social Science and
Common Law ofAdmissions Decisions in Higher &Jucation, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 065, 1 09 1 (1 997)
(pointing out in very strong terms that Bakke remains binding precedent).
1 85. For criticism of affirmative action, see Jim Chen, Embryonic Thoughts on Racial Identity
as New Property, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 123, 1 1 59 ( 1 997). Chen
argues:
Rather, my point is that the reification of racial identity, no Jess among nonwhites than
among whites, has cloaked the affirmative action debate in the rhetoric of takings jurispru·
dence. The transmogrification of race from a suspect classification to an accepted, even

expected, foundation for the modem state's dazzl ing array of new property, from a
deviant basis for decisionmaking to a quotidian category, bodes ill for real healing in a
land so deeply scarre d by the curse of race.
Id. at 1 1 59 .
1 86: 1!opwood,_ 78 F .3 d at 944_-45 ("Indeed, recent Supreme Court precedent shows that the
.
d1vers1ty interest wtll not satisfy stnct scrutiny. Foremost, the Court appem to have decided that
there is essentially only one compelling state interest to justify racial classifications: remedying past
wrongs.").
.

1 87. Id. at 944 ("As the Adarand Court states, the Bakke
Court did not express a majority view
and is questionable as binding precedent").
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scrutiny analysis mandated by the Equal Protection Clause. 111 The Fifth
Circuit held that "remedyin g past wrongs" was the only compelling state
interest that could justify the use of race-based classifications, 189 then set
forth a number of reasons why the pursuit of diversity is not a compelling
state interest. 190 The court noted that diversity "contradicts, rather than
furthers, the aims of equal protection . Diversity fosters, rather than
minim izes, the use of race. It treats minorities as group, rather than as
individuals. It may further remedial purposes but, just as likely, may
promote improper racial stereotypes, thus fueling racial hostility."191 The
court further added that the use of race-based classifications to achieve
diversity promotes stigmatization, 192 and "undercuts the ultimate goal of
the Fourteenth Amendment: the end of racially-motivated state action . "193
Although the Fifth Circuit considered several arguments against the use
of racial classifications to achieve diversity, the opinion does not fully

addres s the countervailing consideration of the University's right to
exercise its institutional autonomy when selecting its student body. The
Hopwood opinion briefly mentions Justice Powell ' s reliance on the
exerci se of institutional autonomy to achieve diversity as a constitutional
ly permissible goal. 194 The court noted :
Saying that a university has a First Amendment interest in this context is
somewhat troubling. Both the medical school in Bakke and, in our case, the law
school are state institutions. The First Amendment generally protects citizens
from the actions of government, not government from its citizens. Significantly,
Sweezy involved a person who was called before the Attorney General of New
Hampshire to answer for alleged subversive activities. He declined on First
Amendment grounds to answer questions about a lecture he had delivered at the
University of New Hampshire.
While Justice Frankfurter spoke of a
university's interest in openness and free inqui�, it was plainly through the
First Amendment rights of individual scholars.1 '
The Fifth Circuit thus dismissed the possibility that an institution can
have any rights that are subject to the protection of the First Amendment
guarantee of academic freedom without a thorough examination of these

1 88. See id. at 944-45.
1 89. Id. at 944.
190. See id. at 945. Circuit Judge Wiener, specially concurring, disagreed with the Court's
treatment of the argument that diversity could serve as a compelling state interest See id. at 962
(Wiener, J., concurring) ("As to diversity, however, I respectfully disagree with the panel opinion's
conclusion that diversity can never be a compelling governmental interest in a public graduate
school.") .
1 9 1 . Id. at 945.
192. See id. at 946.
1 93. Id. at 947-48.
194. Id. at 942-43.
195. Id. at943 n.25 (citing Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234, 262, 266-67 ( 1957)).
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institutional rights. The Fifth Circuit stands alone in its rejection of
diversity as a compell ing justification for the use of race-based selection
criteria within the educational arena. 196
In Bakke, Justice Powell concluded that the equal protection implica
tions generated by the use of race-based classifications can be overcome
by a determination that such use is necessary to achieve a diverse student
body. 197 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Powell recognized that race
and ethnicity are components of American society, and as such, are
essential components of any effort to assemble a student body that is

1 96.

In a recent decision addressing this issue, the First Circuit in Wessmann

v.

Gittens implied

that Hopwood's rejection of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke may have been "premature." 1 60 F.3d

790, 796 ( 1 st Cir. 1998). The First Circuit noted that "in the absence of a clear signal," presumably
from the Court, that diversity is not a compelling justification, the First Circuit "assume[d] arguendo
. . . that Bakke remains good law and that some iterations of 'diversity' might be sufficiently
compelling, in specific circumstances, to justify race-conscious actions." Id. The Wessman court,
however, clearly did not decide the question of whether Bakke remains good law. See id. at 800
("For purposes of resolving this appeal, however, we need not speak definitively to that vexing
question.").
In Wessmann, an unsuccessful white applicant to the Boston Latin Academy, a prestigious public
school, argued that the Academy's use of race and ethnicity in its selection criteria violated the Equal
Protection Clause. See id. at 7 1 3-94. Among other justifications, the Academy argued that its admis
sions policy promoted a diverse student body. See id. at 796-97. The First Circuit concluded that
the policy did not promote diversity, but on the contrary, was an impermissible "mechanism for racial
balancing." Id. at 799. Additionally, the First Circuit concluded that the Policy focused "exclusively
on racial and ethnic diversity," which was inconsistent with Justice Powell's broader definition of
diversity within the academic environment. Id. at 798. Finally, the First Circuit noted the absence
of a particularized showing that its admissions policy furthered their goal of attaining a diverse
student body. See id. at 799-800.
[T]he School Committee exhorts us to find that diversity is essential to the modem
Stated at this level of abstraction, few would gainsay the

learning experience.

attractiveness of diversity. Encounters between students of varied backgrounds facilitate
a vigorous exchange of ideas that not only nourishes the intellect, but also furthers mutual
understanding and respect, thereby eroding prejudice and acting as a catalyst for social
Indeed, Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke acknowledges that these very

harmony.

attributes may render an educational institution's interest in promoting diversity
compelling.
In the last analysis, however, the School Committee's reliance on
generalizations undercuts its construct. If one is to limit consideration to generalities, any

proponent of any notion of diversity could recite a similar litany of virtues. Hence, an
inquiring court cannot content itself with abstractions. Just as Justice Powell probed

whether the racial classification at issue in Bakke in fact promoted the institution's stated
goals, we must look beyond the School Committee's recital of the theoretical benefits of
diversity and inquire whether the concrete workings of the Policy merit constitutional
sanction. Only by such particularized attention can we ascertain whether the Policy bears

any necessary relation to the noble ends it espouses. In short, the devil is in the details.
Id. at 797-98.
197. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
320 (1978).
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representative of that society. 198 He further recognized that the academic
freedom guarantees of the First Amendment are so expansive as to
protect the right of educational institutions to select a student body that
would further this goal. Part III of this Article provides the constitutional
framework for the nexus established by Justice Powell between diversity
and the exercise of academic freedom.
III.

THE

ACADEMIC NATURE OF

EDUCATIONAL

DIVERSllY

Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was founded on the creation of a
nexus between the traditional interpretations of the academic freedom
doctrine and the goal of attainment of student body diversity. The
viabi lity of this nexus, however, has been significantly limited by Justice
Powell's failure to set forth the analytical paradigm upon which the nexus
is based. 199 Because the attainment of a diverse student body is not
possible in the absence of admissions policies designed to effectuate this
goal,200 Part III initially explores whether admissions decisions fall within

198. See id. at 291-95, 3 1 4; see also RUDENSTINE, supra note 38, at 1 -2. Rudenstine argues:
We need to remind ourselves that student diversity has, for more than a century, been
valued for its capacity to contribute powerfully to the process of learning and to the
creation of an effective educational environment. It has also been seen as vital to the
education of citizens-and the development of leaders-in heterogenous democratic
societies such as our own. These overarching values have for many decades influenced
our approach to admissions, and have provided the rationale for our basic policies.
Id.

1 99. Professor Jim Chen argues that in the absence of an assertion that there is an academic
basis for the use of race or ethnicity in selection criteria for students or faculty, "affirmative action
in the name of diversity is content-based regulation of speech." Chen, supra note IS, at 1875. In
this regard, the infringement ofthe academic freedom of students and faculty, Professor Chen argues,
"outweighs the university's administrative interests." Id. ("Diversity-inspired educational affirmative
action represents a conscious effort to shape the collective speech of a university. When government
is 'attempting to control or direct the content of . . . speech,' it cannot ask courts to defer to a
university's institutional judgment in the name of 'academic freedom."' (quoting University of Pa.
v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 197 (1990))) .
It is the position of this author that there are academic justifications for the attainment of student
body d iversity that outweigh any possible restrictions on educational speech. The impact ofdiversity
on classroom pedagogy and discourse serves not to control but to enhance the quality of academic
speech. Accordingly, the primary focus of this Article is to set forth academic justifications for the
use of race-based admissions criteria by establishing a nexus between the attainment of student body
diversity and the fulfillment of the traditional goals of educational institutions.
200. This outcome is due, in part, to the use of numerical predictors, such as undergraduate
GPAs and standardized test scores, by admissions decision-makers to evaluate prospective applicants.
Whether attributable to racism, cultural bias, or educational disadvantage, racial and ethnic minorities
have achieved only marginal success in their pursuit of higher education. See generally SUSAN
WELCH & JOHN GRUHL, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY ENROLLMENTS IN MEDICAL AND LAW
SCHOOLS ( 1 998); Katherine Connor & Ellen J. Vargyas, The Legal Implications of Gender Bias in
Standardized Testing, 7 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 1 3 (1992); Theodore Cross & Robert Bruce Slater,
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the parameters of the academic decision-making process. The remaining
portion of this section examines the impact of diversity on each of the
traditional goals of educational institutions-teaching, inquiry, research
and publication,2°1 thus establishing the basis for applying the academic
freedom doctrine to protect the attainment of diversity as a function of
academic decision-making.
Admissions Decisions Are Exercises ofAcademic Decision-Making

A.

The doctrine of institutional autonomy is limited in its applicability to
"genuinely academic decisions."202 Although Justice Stevens in Ewing
and Justice Powell in Bakke applied varying pennutations of the
in.stitutional autonomy doctrine, neither Justice specifically defined the
types of decisions that could be classified as academic. 203 As a result,
there is no express standard for detennining whether the decision-making

Special Report: Why the End of Affirmative Action

Would Exclude All But a Very Few Blacks from

America 's Leading Universities and Graduate Schools, J. BLACKS HIGHER Eouc., Autumn 1 997, at

8; Edward J. Littlejohn & Leonard S. Rubinowitz, Black Enrollment in law Schools: Forward to the
& Lani Guinier, The Future of

Past?, 12 T. MARsHALL L. REV. 4 1 5 (1 987); Susan Sturm

Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953 ( 1 996); Linda F.
Wightman, The Threat to Diversity in Legal Education: An Empirical Analysis of the Consequences

U. L. REV. 1 (1 997);
ofAbandoning Race as a Factor in Law School Admissions Decisions, 72 N.Y.
SA T Scores Show Gains in Math, But Not in Literacy, STAR Tlue. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept 2,
1 998, at 16A.
20 1 .

See Finkin, supra note 13, at 846.

These opinions do hold open

the prospect of a fuller integration of the idea of autonomy

as part of a general theory of academic freedom. . . . [T]he German idea [of academic
freedom) was premised upon the university as a self-governing body of faculty. In
America, [however,] "the university" encompasses a lay governing board and its

to which the faculty is legally subordinate. Any reintegration of
to take account of this difference. But neither opinion so much as

administrative delegates
the two would have

hints at it. On the contrary, the Powell and Stevens opinions would protect as exercises
of"academic freedom" decisions that are not necessarily related to content or methods of
instruction, or to research, inquiry, and publication.
insulate need not, and often

are

In fact, the decisions they would

not, made by academics at all.

Id.
202. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 2 1 4, 225 (1985).
203. See Van Alstyne, supra note 19, at 137.
Powell's use of"academic freedom" in Bakke, and his quotation of the dictum by Justice
Frankfurter from the Sweezy case, represent no departure from the usages of academic
freedom we have examined. When Powell writes of academic freedom as "long . . .
vie�ed as a special concern of the First Amendment," his emphasis remains constant at
_
all times. To gam
purchase through the first amendment, the decision in any academic
freedom case, whether individual or institutional, must still rest-as Frankfurt noted-on
er
academic and not some other grounds. It is all the same moreover whether the decision
pertains to "who may be admitted to study" rather th
to "who ay teach," or "what
may be taught," or "how."

�

Id.

�
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engaged in by an educational institution is academic and thus protected
by the First Amendment, or unprotected administrative decision-making.
Due to the vast complexity of the decision-making process within an
educational institution, articulation of a rigid standard is not desirable.
The definition of an academic decision, therefore, must be a fluid
paradigm, capable of adapting to the changing needs and influences of an
educational institution. Although no express definition of an academic
decision exists, the Supreme Court's decisions in this area offer guidance
in the development of such a standard.

1.

Exercise of Professional Judgment

The first prong of the standard that defines academic decision-making
focuses on the expertise o f the decision-maker. It is essential that the
academic decision-maker possess a level of professional knowledge or
expertise sufficient to give the judiciary enough confidence in the merit
of the decision to warrant judicial deference. Reliance on the profession
al judgment of members o f the academy is consistent with the position
adopted on several occasions by the Supreme Court. In Board of
Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 204 Justice Rehnquist
recognized the need for judicial deference to the University's dismissal
of a medical student for inadequate perfonnance because the decision
"require[d] an expert evaluation of cumulative information. "205 Similarly,
in Ewing, Justice Stevens counseled that when reviewing "the substance
of a genuinely academic decision, . . . [the judiciary] should show great
respect for the faculty's professional judgment."206
This component of the standard is not dependent on the title or status
of the decision-maker as much as it is on the knowledge or skill applied
by the decision-maker. For example, in Horowitz, the Court upheld the
plaintiff's dismissal, which had been based in part on the inclusion of the
faculty's professional judgment in the procedural mechanism used to
evaluate her academic and clinical performance. 207 Throughout her tenure

204.
205.

435 U.S. 78 (1978).
Id. at 90; see also id. at 96 n.6 (Powell, J., concurring) ("University faculties must have the

widest range of discretion in making judgements as to the academic performance of students and their
entitlements to promotion or graduation.").

206.

Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 ("Plainly, [judges] may not override [a genuine academic decision]

unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the
person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment").

207.

See Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 80-82. A similar conclusion was reached by Justice Stevens in

Ewing. See 474 U.S. at 225 ("Ewing's claim, therefore, must be that the University misjudged his
fitness to remain a student in the Inteflex program. The record unmistakably demonstrates, however,
that the faculty's decision was made conscientiously and with careful deliberation, based on an

evaluation of the entirety of Ewing's academic career.").
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in medical school, the plaintiff had received periodic performance
evaluations from the "Council on Evaluation, a body composed of both
faculty and students."201 Members of the faculty, who were physicians,
reported repeated incidences of unsatisfactory clinical performance to the
Council. 209 The C ouncil ultimately recommended that the plaintiff be
dismissed from school. 2 1 0 Additional faculty members serving on the
Coordinating Committee of the medical school reviewed the dismissal
decision, and the Dean subsequently ratified the dismissal. 2 1 1
As Horowitz illustrates, the level of expertise necessary for academic
decision-making may be so specialized that it is inappropriate for judicial
or administrative fact-finders to review the underlying merit of such
decisions. 2 1 2 Justice Rehnquist acknowledged as much in Horowitz when
he stated that grading or disciplinary decisions are "not readily adapted
to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking."213
With respect to admissions decisions, Professor Matthew Finkin argues
that "the Powell and Stevens opinions would protect as exercises of
'academic freedom ' decisions that are not necessarily related to content
or methods of instruction, or to research, inquiry, and publication. In
fact, the decisions that they would insulate need not, and often are not,
made by academics at all."2 14 A recent survey of law school admissions
programs indicates, however, that law schools utilize several types of
admissions decision-making models, most of which include significant
faculty participation. 2 15 There is no doubt that the involvement of law

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Horowitz, 435

U.S. at 80.

See id. at 80-82.
See id. at 82.
See id.
See also DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 3 12, 344 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("Courts

. ).
213. Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 90; see also DeFunis, 4 1 6 U.S. at 325 (Douglas, J ., dissenting).

are not educators; their expertise is limited . .

.

"

Justice Douglas stated:

The educational policy choices confronting a university admissions committee are not
ordinarily a subject for judicial oversight; clearly it is not for us but for the law school
to decide which tests to employ, how heavily to weigh recommendations from professors
or undergraduate grades, and what level of achievement on the chosen criteria are
sufficient to demonstrate that the candidate is qualified for admission.

DeFunis, 416 U.S. at 325.

214. Finkin, supra note 13, at 846.
2 1 5. An unpublished survey of approximately 130 ABA law schools conducted by the Law
School Admission Council in 1997 indicates that law schools utilize three primary types of
admissions models. The most commonly used model is the "Presumptive Model." The major
charactcristic of �is model is that admissions files are placed
in "presumptive admit or presumptive
_
deny cate�ones.
e
�urvey
responses
i:ii
indicate the presumptive categories are determined by
_
consideration of pnmanly numerical predictors,
such as LSAC index, LSAT scores, and
undergraduate grade point averages. Applicants that
do not fall within either presumptive category
are forwarded to the admissions committee
for 8 decision. There are two other admiss ions decision·
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school faculty in the admi ssions process is significant for several reasons,
the least of which involves the faculty's role as "academics." Most
significantly, classroom experience exposes law faculty to a large variety
of students with various ranges of intellectual abi lities. This presents a
unique opportunity for law faculty to identify potential characteristics that
are necessary for a successful law school experience.2 16 This ability to
recognize valued characteristics, such as maturity, analytical ability,
academic potential, and verbal or written communications skills, cannot
be ascertained from a review of numerical predictors whose validity
recently has been called into question.217 In addition, law faculty seek

making models that are used by the law schools responding to the LSAC survey. The "Sole Decider
Model" relies on the dean or director of admission to make all decisions. "The decision-maker is
also usually involved in setting enrollment and class diversity goals." Generally, the role of the
admissions committee in a school utilizing this model is policy-making. Obviously, the nature of
this model limits the extent of faculty involvement in the admissions decision-making process. The
third type of admissions model used is the "Full Committee Review Model." This model is the most
labor intensive model for faculty members. This model "places full responsibility for decision
making on a faculty committee who divide and review all files, and in cases, meet as a committee,
or a subcommittee, to make decisions."
The survey responses indicate that 98% of the participating law schools have admissions
committees. Fifty-three percent (53%) of the schools indicated that between 40-IOCWe of their total
applications are reviewed by the committee. One hundred and ten law schools reported the presence
of faculty on their committees, and 1 12 schools indicated that a faculty member chairs their
committee. In addition to reading files and making admissions decisions, the admissions committees
establishes policy and interview prospective candidates.
216. See Olivas, supra note 1 84, at 1 067. Olivas argues:
Professional admissions decisions are crucial both to institutions and to students.
Institutions care about the fit between students and the program, and, of course, every
faculty member wants to teach the "best" students they can attract and enroll. Students,
of course, want the best and most efficacious program .to which they can reasonably
aspire. Therefore, institutions strive to adopt admissions criteria that accurately and
reliably predict optimum performance in their programs. Schools seek both high scorers
and those students whose academic predictors do not place them at the top end of their
classes, but on whom the schools are willing to take modest risks that they can succeed.
Id.

See generally Wightman, supra note 200, at 29. Wightman argues:
The tension between commitment to the principles of racial and ethnic diversity and of
competitive evaluation based on quantifiable indicators of individual achievement
frequently results in questions about the appropriateness of the use of numerical
indicators, especially the LSAT, in the admission process. These questions typically are
raised by questioning the validity of the test, particularly the validity of its use with
applicants of color. However, one does not need to argue that the test is invalid or a
biased predictor against members of certain groups in order to substantiate the negative
consequences of misuse or overuse of the test in the admission process. The LSAT is
valid for a limited use and has a clearly defined, narrow focus: it is a test of acquired
reading and verbal reasoning skills that have been shown to correlate with academic
successes in the first year of law school. When it is used for a different and/or far
broader purpose, not only is the use inappropriate, but calling on the test to do more than

2 1 7.
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students who have the potential to contribute to the academic vitality of
their institution.
Although faculty participation in the process can further institutional
values as well as pedagogical concerns, it is important to recognize that
other members of the institution who possess similar knowledge and
expertise also could function as capable decision-makers. As long as the
primary component of the academic decision-making stan
dard-professional knowledge and expertis�is incorporated into the
decision-making model, the first prong of the academic decision-making
standard would be satisfied.
2.

Narrowly Define the Scope of Academic Decisions

The second prong of the standard for determining whether the
decision-making of an educational institution is academic or unprotected
administrative decision-making focuses on the nature of the decision.
Relying on the common meaning of "academic" narrows the definition
of academic decision-making to issues pertaining to or concerning the
primary function of the educational institution, which is "the pursuit of
and dissemination of knowledge."2 18 The definition of an academic
decision can be further refined by focusing on the traditional pedagogical
goals of "teaching, inquiry, research, and publication."2 19 This standard
is broad enough to encompass decisions relating to the essential core
functions of an educational institution, yet narrow enough to exclude
important, but nonessential decisions m ade within the context of the
educational environment, such as the selection of a food service provider
or team mascot.
The Supreme Court has provided guidance in narrowing the parameters
of an academic decision. Justice Powell, i n his concurring opinion in
Ewing, referred to the admissions decision-making process as an

it was intended to do damages its validity.
Also note that Justice Douglas in his dissenting opinion in DeFunis argued for the poss ible
elimination of the LSAT as a predictor of minority perfonnance in law school due to certain inherent
limitations in accounting for the impact of cultural differences. See DeFunis, 4 1 6 U.S. at 329
(Douglas, J., dissenting). He theorized that "[t)here are many relevant factors, such as motivation,

Id.

cultural backgrounds of specific minorities that the test can not measure, and they inevitably must
impair its value as a predictor." Id.

2 1 8. The word "academic" is defined as "of, or belonging to, or associated with an academy or
school especially of higher learning." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE UNABRIDGED 9 (1981). It further defines "school"
as "an organized body of
scholars and teachers associated for the pursuit of and dissemination of knowledge." Id. at 203 1 ; see
also B�me' su�ra note 4 1 , � 333 <"And what are the indigenous values served by universities? First,
.
. ts the preeminent institution
the umvers1ty
in our society where knowledge and understanding are
pursued with detachment or disinterestedness.").
219. Finkin, supra note 13, at 829.
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"academic decision."220 He noted that "Li]udicial review of academic
decisions, including those with respect to the admission or dismissal of
" 1
students, is rarely appropriate. 22 Justice Powe l l ' s reference to admis
sions and dism issal decisions within this context is consistent with his
advocacy of institutional autonomy to protect the rights of an educational
institution to select "who may be admitted to study."222
Lower federal courts have adopted similar positions with respect to
decisions affecting student grades. For instance, in Balisok v. Boutz, 223

the Ninth Circuit noted that "[s]tudent grades and evaluations are
academi c decisions and as such are not generally appropriate for judicial
review and interference un less they are 'a substantial departure from
accepted academic nonns. "'224 Also, in McGregor v. Louisiana State
University Board ofSupervisors,m the Fifth Circuit detenn ined that a law
school ' s refusal to advance a disabled law student to the second year o f
6
law school was an academic decision. 22 The court held that ''the Law
Center's decision to require ful l-time attendance and in-class examinations
for first year students are academic decisions, ones which we find
reasonable in light of the Law Center's admittance practices."227
The definition of academic decisions has even been expanded to
encompass issues affecting faculty. In Huang v. Board of Governors of
the University of North Carolina, 228 the Fourth Circuit held that the
University's interderartment transfer of a tenured professor was an
academic decision.22 The court noted that "[w]hen j udges are asked to
review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one,

220. Regents ofthe Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 230 ( I 985) (Powell, J., concurring).
221 . Id.
222. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 3 1 2 ( 1978) (citing Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 263 (1957)).
223. 46 F.3d 1 138 (unpublished opinion), No. 93-35516, 1995 WL 23592, at •3 (9th Cir. 1995)
(citing Ewing, 414 U.S. at 225-26); see also Kaltenberger v. Ohio College of Podiatric Med., 162
F.3d 432, 437 (6th Cir. 1998). The Kallenberger court stated:
The decision of the College not to waive this requirement [pennitting plaintiff to retake
an examination after failing a course twice] and lower the standards for continuing
training in podiatric medicine is entitled to deference. We should only reluctantly
intervene in academic decisions ..especially regarding degree requirements on the health
care field when the conferral of a degree places the school's imprimatur upon the student
as qualified to pursue his chosen profession."
162 F.3d at 437 (citing Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry. 862 F.2d 570, 576 (6th Cir.
1988)) .
224. Ba/isok, 1995 WL 23592, at •3 (citing Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225-26).
225. 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. 1993).
226. See id. at 859.
227. Id.
228. 902 F.2d 1 134 (4th Cir. 1 990).
229. See id. at 1 142.
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they should show great respect for the faculty's professionaljudgment."230
The Fifth Circuit adopted a similar analysis in Wi//iams v. Texas Tech
University Health Services Center,23 1 when it refused to interfere with the
University ' s decision to reduce the salary of a tenured faculty member.232
The court reiterated that judicial deference must be afforded to legitimate
exercises of academic decision-making. 2 33
Obviously, this analysis does not offer a bright-line standard for
distinguishing between academic and nonacademic decision-making. In
fact, given the number and complexity of the educational environment,
such a standard is not desirable. The academic decision-making model
should be a fact-based continuum that offers guidance in determining the
extent that such decision-making may be insulated from constitutional
scrutiny.
The Impact of Student Diversity on Each of the Traditional Goals
B.
of Educational Institutions- "Teaching, Inquiry, Research and
Publication "

Professor Matthew Finkin has argued that educational institutions have
four primary goals: ''teaching, inquiry, research, and publication."234 The
establishment of a nexus between admissions policies aimed at achieving
student body diversity and these pedagogical goals is at the core of
Justice Powell ' s willinP,ess to extend First Amendment protections to
admissions decisions. 23 Unfortunately, this task is made more daunting

230.

Id. (citing Regents of the Univ. of Mich.

232.

See id. at 294.
See id. ("Judicial

23 1 .

233.

6 F.3d 290

(Sth Cir.

1993).

v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 225 (198 5)).

evaluation of academic decisions requires deference and they are

overturned only if they are 'such a substantial departure from accepted academic nonns as to
demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional
judgment.").
234. Finkin, supra note 13, at 829; see also Sylvia Hurtado & Christine Navia, Reconciling

College Access and the Affirmative Action Debate, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION'S TEsTAMENT

OF HOPE:

STRATEGIF.S FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION 105, 1 1 0 (Mildred Garcia ed., 199 7). Hurtado
and Navia argue that the achievement of a diverse learning environment is also a goal of educational
institutions.

See id.

These forms of preferences in admissions practices, including the preference for racial
diversity, can withstand legal challenges because they are intended to serve an educational

purpose. Today, a m ajor educational goal of many institutions is to create a multicultural
environment for student learning. To achieve that goal, these institutions must both attract

Id.

and maintain a diverse student body.
(citation omitted).

235. Professor Finkin also is very critical of the application of the academic freedom doctrine
to insulate a university's admissions decisions from constitutional scrutiny. He asserts that in the

absence of a nexus between a university's exercise of its administrative responsib ilities and the
educational goals ofinstruction, research, inquiry, or publication, the application of academic freedom
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by the absence of quantitative empirical research evaluating the impact
of student body diversity within the classroom, especially as it pertains
to race and ethnicity. 236 In the absence of such quantitative data,
qualitative reflections on this issue serve as the only source of data. In
this regard, the remaining portion of this section examines narratives that
describe the impact of diversity on these traditional goals. The law
school environment serves a s our laboratory.237
Teaching: Selection o f C ourse Materials

1.

The first area of inquiry focuses on ways in which student diversity
influences the preparation and selection of course materials. As a
threshold matter, faculty members now have a great selection of
textbooks that include issues pertaining to race, class, sexual orientation,

as a barrier to judicial scrutiny is misplaced.

See Finkin, supra note 13,

at

849. Finkin concedes,

however, that there are circumstances in which admissions decisions and traditional educational goals
are closely related:
So, too, some admissions decisions may be closely tied to the institution's teaching and
research goals.

The admissions decisions of a graduate department in a particular

discipline, for example, are an inextricable part of the faculty 's teaching and research
goals when graduate students also function as research or teaching assistants. A plea for
autonomy in admissions decisions in this context would also draw support from the claim
of academic freedom.

Id

at

849.

Finkin further argues that Justice Powell in

Bakke failed to undertake an "exacting examination"

of whether such a nexus existed before engaging in the "relatively simple act of labeling" the .
University's preferential admissions policies as a protected exercise of"institutional autonomy."
at 849-50.

236.

There are several studies evaluating gender in the classroom.

Id.

See generally LANI GUINIER

ET AL., BECOMING GENTLEMEN: WOMEN, LAW SCHOOL, AND INSTITIJTIONAL. CHANGE

(1997);

lOUISE HARMON & DEBORAH W. POST, CULTIVATING INTELLIGENCE: POWER, LAW, AND IBE
POLITICS OF TEACHING

(1996);

LINDA

F.

W IGHTMAN, LAW SCHOOL ADMISSION COUNCIL, WOMEN

IN LEGAL EDUCATION: A COMPARISON OF THE LAW SCHOOL PERFORMANCE AND LAW SCHOOL

( 1 996); Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom,
14 S. ILL. U. L.J. 527 (1990); Marsha Garrison et al., Succeeding in Law School: A Comparison of
Women 's Experiences at Brooklyn Law School and the University of Pennsylvania, 3 MICH. J.
GENDER & L. 515 (1996); Mertz et al., supra note 18, at I.
237. See Stephanie M. Wildman, Teaching and Learning Toward Transformation: The Role of
EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND MEN

the Classroom in Noticing Privilege, in
UNDERMINES AMERICA

PRIVILEGE REVEALED: How INVISIBLE PREFERENCE

161, 167 (Stephanie M. Wildman ct al. eds., 1 996). Wildman argues that

[t]he struggle talcing place in the academy to make gender, race, and sexual orientation
a part of the law school curriculum is part of this difficult struggle toward inclusive
community. This movement has been fueled primarily by students and a number of law
professors, many of whom are members of the Society of American Law Teachers. These
members of the legal academy recognize the relevance and importance of issues relating
to race, gender, and sexual orientation, not only to our lives but also to our teaching and
learning.

Id.
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disability, and gender from which to choose. 23 1 The choice of textbook
can thereafter detennine the extent that traditional monocultural
pedagogy239 or d iversity discourse-wh ich seeks to incorporate the
h istory, ideas, and experiences of minorities into the curriculum-will
shape class discussions. In addition, even in the absence of such
textbooks, faculty members are selecting reading materials that reflect
their rejection of m onocultural curricula. 2•0 Selection of course materials
that reflect an interest in diversity is not, however, without its difficulty.
For instance, Professor Lisa C. Ikemoto identifies several costs associated
with compiling diverse course materials, including loss of time to focus
on "writing articles that would get more credit at promotion and tenure

238. Recent text book publications include KATHARINE T. BARTI..ETI & ANGELA P. HARRIS,
GENDER AND LAW: THEoR Y, DocTiuNE, COMMENTARY (2d ed. 1998); MARY BECKER ET AL.,
FEMlNIST JURISPRUDENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY (1994); LESLIE BENDER & DAAN
BRAVEMAN, POWER, PRIVILEGE AND LAW: A CIVIL RIGHTS READER (1995); CURTIS J. BERGER &
JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE (4th ed. 1997); JULIE A. NI CE & LoUISE
G. TRUBEK, POVERTY LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE ( 1 997); JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW:

RULES , POLICES, AND PRACTICES (2d ed.1997); GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTJTIJTIONAL LAW
(3d ed. 1996); D. KELLY WEISBERG & SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW (1 998).
239. Sonia Nieto notes that a monocultural curriculum gives students "only one way of seeing
the world. Reality is often presented in schools as static, finished, and flat. The underlying tensions,
controversies, passions, and problems faced by people throughout history and today are sadly
missing." SONIA NIETO, AFFIRMING DIVERSITY 3 1 9 (2d ed. 1 996); see also Linda S . Marchesani

Dynamics of Diversity in the Teaching-Learning Process: A Faculty
Development Model for Analysis and Action, New Directions for Teaching and Learning, No. 52
& Maurianne Adams,

(Maurianne Adams ed., 1992), Marchesani and Adams argue:
Furthennore, the monocultural experiences of faculty from dominant groups socialized
within mainstream culture often create a context in which attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors
are not acknowledged as reflections of a particular racial group (white), ethnic heritage
(European), or gender orientation (male) but are thought of as universal human traits. The
tendency of individuals from dominant cultural groups to see their nonns and traditions
as universally valued and preferred supports a cultural embededness that makes it
extremely difficult to acknowledge the extent of negative assumptions and stereotypes
toward those with the culture-specific beliefs we grew up with, we are surely responsible
for examining and questioning them as adults and as educators.
Id. at 14 (citations omitted).

In discussing his use of two civil rights text books, ROY BROOKS ET AL., CIVIL RIGHTS
supra note 238,
Professor John 0. Calmore notes that
[p]rior to this casebook's publication . . . I had to rely on developing my own materi als,
which lacked the advantage of good editing (they were too long), notes and problems,
and, I admit, a basic coherence. In many ways the publication of this book and my
supplemental text legitimated my materials and approach, somewhat rebutting the notion
that my teaching approach and coverage of the course were so far 'out there' as to be
kooky.
240.

LITIGATION: CASES ANO PERSPECTIVES (1995), and BENDER & BRAVEMAN,

John 0. Calmore, Close Encounters of the Racial
Conversations, 3 1 U.S.F. L. REV. 903, 91 1 (1997)

Kind: Pedagogical Reflections and Seminar
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time,"241 loss of political capital defending an "alternative perspective"
that "may be perceived as threatening to the authority of others, as well
as to the authority of m ajority viewpoints,"242 and loss of emotional
energy. She writes:
I often put together my own course materials. Obviously, this takes a great deal
of time. It takes more time to compile readings that expressly address race,
gender, sexual orientation, and class than it does to compile readings that
express the "law-is-neutral" approach. There arc few published texts to use as
models . . . . [Y]ou have to do extra research to identify and locate readings that
accomplish those teaching goals. I say "extra research" because contextualizing
the course subject in a way that makes the social categories obvious often means
taking an interdisciplinary approach. As a practical matter, that means
c ramming in a bit of history, sociological method, science, and other areas . . .
. But the fact that it takes so much additional effort to add context and use an
interdisciplinary approach indicates how pervasive and deeply ingrained
acontextual, separatist analysis is at law.20

Teaching: Implementation of Diverse Pedagogical Methods

2.

It is important to understand that incorporating diversity into
monocultural curricula does not stop with the selection of diverse course
materials.244 This second area of inquiry focuses on ways in which
diversity influences pedagogical methods in the c lassroom. Both faculty
and students must acknowledge the variety of social, political, and
cultural experiences that are at work, and must attempt to foster an
environment that is safe and comfortable for the expression of viewpoints
without recrimination.245 S everal common themes have been advanced

24 1 .

Lisa Chiyemi Ikemoto, Some Tips on How to Endanger the White Male Privilege in Law

Teaching, 19 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 79, 82 (1997).

242. Id. at 83.
243. Id. at 82.
244. See Mildred Garcia, Conclusions: Strategies for a New Era, in AFFIRMATIVE ACTION S
TusTAMENT OF HOPE: STRATEGIFS FOR A NEW ERA IN HIGHER EDUCATION 250 (Mildred Garcia ed.,
1997). Garcfa argues:
'

Increased diversity in our classrooms brings academic vitality through the presence of
different perspectives, different views, different languages, and different cultures. In these
venues, questions are appropriately raised by those whose experiences and perspectives
might be different from what has been presented in the past These differing viewpoints
can lead to rethinking old knowledge and generating new knowledge. Most important,
diversity requires defining and perhaps redefining "truth"-the concept at the core of
education and discovery.
Id. (citation omitted.)
245. See MAURIANNE ADAMS, Pedagogical Frameworks for Social Justice Education, in

TEACHING FOR DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A SOURCEBOOK 30, 37 (Maurianne Adams et al.
eds., 1 997)
Classroom safety is integrally tied to respect and the expression of emotion, especially
emotions perceived

as

negative, such as fear, discomfort, threat, pain, anxiety, hostility,

[Vol . 47
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by law faculty mem bers who, in an effort to abandon monocultural
d iscourse and curricula, have modified their pedagogical approach in
response to either d iversity within the classroom or societal diversity .246
For example, Professor David Dom inguez theorizes that with i n the law
school environment, competing interests and an unequal allocation of
resources lead to "zero-sum outcomes . "2 4 7 Professor Dom inquez argues,
however, that with in this environment, trad itional law school pedagogy
can be transformed to include multicultural interests by adopting a
1
"negotiable learn ing" teaching method . 2 4
Th is method rel ies on
"multicultural negotiation between small groups of students modeled after
integrative bargaining in the commercial c ontext."249 Other m e mbers of
the legal academy indicate that they are m o re sensitive to the concerns of
m inority students when controversial issues arise-that even in the
absence of minority students, they expose majority students to i ssues of
race, gender, and c lass-and that they either modify their coverage or at
least control class discussions to acknow ledge the concern s of m i nority
students.250 This shift in pedagogical approaches is clearly in its infancy.

and anger.
"Students must feel secure that their comments will be treated with respect whether or
not the faculty member or the class agrees with them. Students must have confidence

that faculty members

are

in control of the discussion and will intervene, if necessary,

to prevent personal expressions from provoking personal attacks by some who may find
them offensive.

At the same time, the faculty members must balance the need for

creating a safe space with their obligation to see to it that blatantly false bel iefs
subjected to mature and thoughtful criticism.

are

Striking the correct balance is no easy

task."
Id. (citation omitted)).

246. See Charles R. Calleros, Training a Diverse Student Bodyfor a Multicultural Society, 8 LA
RAzA L.J. 140, 140 (1995). Calleros argues that
[t]he legal profession and legal education, once nearly exclusively the province of white
males, has not remained unaffected by these (demographic] changes. Diversifying the
student body has done more than create academic and professional opportunities for
formerly excluded segments of our population. It has also introduced new challenges in
teaching students with profoundly different experiences.
Id.

247.

David Dominguez, Beyond Zero-Sum Games: Multiculturalism

for All Students, 44 J. LEGAL EDUC.

248.
249.

Id. at

as

175, 175 (1994).

Enriched Law Training

178.

Id. at 177-78 (discussing "integrative bargaining in the commercial context-Le., exchanges

of goods or services which take optimal advantage of the parties' shared interests and, as well, trade
efficiently on the parties' differences.

250.

See generally Calmore, supra note 240, at 903 ; OkianerChristian Dark, Incorporating Issues

of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual Orientation, and Disability into Law School Teaching, 32
WILLAMEITE L. REV. 541 (1996); Kimberly E. O'Leary, Using "Difference Analysis " to Teach
Problem-Solving, 4 CLINICAL L. REv. 65 (1997); Reginald Leamon Robinson, Teaching From the

E. Young,
hing, 1 1
Teac
Two Sreps Removed: The Paradox ofDiversity Discourse/or Women ofColor in Law

Margins: Race as a Pedagogical Sub-Te::ct,

19

W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 1 5 1

(1997); Donna
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Recognizing the value o f m inority student voices when incorporating
diversity issues into traditional pedagogy cannot be overemphasized.

25 1

As a threshold matter, within traditional monocultural classroom environ
ments both women and m inority students have expressed feelings of
isolation which lead to decreased classroom participation and silencing.

BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J.

25 1 .

270 ( 1996)

252

.

Many commentators have d iscussed the posilive social and pedagogical benefits that can be

derived from classroom diversity.

See, for example, Tanya Murphy's argument that educational

diversity serves as an enhancement of the academic environment:
Educational diversity provides many educational, economic, and social benefits that make
it an indispensable component of the academic environment

First, diversifying the

student body broadens the academic dialogue by adding value to the contributions made
by those who do not fit within the "White male norm.''

Current affirmative action

policies and doctrines unfortunately lead many to conclude that all Blacks are somehow
less qualified or less deserving of their seat at the university than their White peers.
Under the diversity principle, however, Blacks admitted to institutions through affirmative
action initiatives are not viewed as "intellectually disadvantaged" per se. To the contrary,
Justice Powell's theory of educational diversity "requires that admissions programs treat
m i nority-race applicants as persons who have something valuable to contribute to the
educational environment rather than as persons who need special help." This perspective
characterizes affirmative action not as handout, but as a method for ensuring that colleges
and universities have the elements necessary to provide their students with the most
rewarding educational experience possible, in a manner most beneficial to society.
Tanya Murphy, An Argument for Diversity Based Affirmative Action in Higher Education,
SURV. AM. L.

5 1 5, 541-42 ( 1 995); see also, e.g. ,

95 ANN.

Leo M. Romero, View from the Chair:

Diversity-The legally Defensible Argument, LAW SERVICES REP. (Law School Admission Council,
Newton, Pa.), Jan./Feb.

1999 at I , 8.

("In thinking about the value of diversity in your law school,

consider that the variety and richness of the intellectual discourse gives diversity its real power, and
that our schools would be the poorer without the insights and perspectives that come from students

from different races, cultures, and backgrounds.''); CHRISTOPHER EDLEY, JR., NOT ALL BLACK AND

WHITE

1 37 ( 1992).

Edley argues:

In many settings, inclusion means opportunity and the richness of integration. And in
some institutions, especially public and elite ones, visible inclusion also has powerful
symbolic value, both political and social. It communicates an openness about the power
structure, it commands legitimacy, and it leads traditionally excluded groups to believe,
correctly, that the exclusion has softened or perhaps dissolved.
EDLEY, supra, at

252.

137.

See Stephanie M. Wildman, The Question of Silence:

Techniques to Ensure Full Class

Participation, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 147, 148-49 (1988).
All teaching, if it is worth anything, involves transmitting values:
professors and professors learn from students.

students learn from

The transmission is rarely an equal

interchange, however, because students look to the professor as the classroom authority
on all issues, including the value o f class contributions. Professors may use this authority,
both consciously and unconsciously, to silence points of view and class participation or
to encourage participation.

Id. (citation omitted).
The psychological impact of the devaluation of students, particularly African American women,

was demonstrated by Professor Patricia J. Williams in THE ALcHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS

(1991 ):

55
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One possible explanation for alienation and the resulting s i lence is the
women's and m inority students ' lack of ownership or investment in the
course material.2s3 Traditional monocu ltural curriculum does not include
the cultural and historic events that serve as the building blocks for the
ideas and experiences of m inority students.2s4 This inabi lity to create a

My abiding recollection of being a student at Harvard Law School is the sense of being
invisible . . . . I observed large, mostly male bodies assert themselves against one another
like football players caught in the gauzy mist of intellectual slow motion.

I stood my

ground amid them, watching them deflect from me, unconsciously, politely, as i f l were
a pillar in a crowded corridor. Law school was for me l ike being on another planet, full
of alienated creatures with whom I could make little connection. The school created a
dense atmosphere that muted my voice to inaudibility. All I could do to communicate my
existence was to posit carefully worded messages into hermetically sealed, vacuum-packed
blue books, place them on the waves of that foreign sea, and pray that they would be
plucked up by some curious seeker and understood.
Id. at SS; see also Banks, supra note 236, at 537 ("[T]he law school classroom is still structured to
meet the needs of white upper-middle class males.
performance may

be

adversely

affected.");

Charles

The result is alienated students whose

R.

Lawrence

Ill,

Foreword:

Race,

Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 41 STAN. L. REV. 8 1 9, 84 1 ( 1 995).
Lawrence states:
I have tried to make the classes ethnically diverse .

It is important that many different

ethnic communities are represented, and it is also important that, where possible, a critical
mass of students appears from each ethnic group.

This class must be a place where

students who find themselves marginalized and alienated within white institutions can
experience some of the safety and nurturance of homeplace. It must be a place where
students are confident that there is enough common cause, enough trust, enough good
will, enough shared experience and understanding to enable them to confront the most
difficult conflicts within and between our communities and to address the hardest issues
of ideology and strategy.
Lawrence, supra, at 84 1 .
253.

But see Dark, supra note 250, at 572. Dark argues that

[s)ome teachers fear silence, especially when it follows the introduction of an issue about
affirmative action or the creation of a tort for racial insults.

Silence, however, is a

wonderful teaching tool, especially in moments of awkwardness and uneasiness. Silence
can help students focus on the underlying assumptions that he or she may be making
regarding the efficacy of atfmnative action. Sometimes I expect or build in silence at
certain points in the discussion that can be used for further reflection. I tell the students
what the silent period is for and do not permit anyone to speak before everyone has had
a chance to think more carefully about his or her point of entry into the discussion.
Awkward silence

can

be a useful reminder to students that there are many reasons why

discussion of these issues is uncomfortable and difficult for them. Likewise, they may
experience this same awkward silence in court, at a negotiation, or with a client when
they feel it is appropriate to raise an issue concerning diversity on behalf of the client.
They must learn not to fear it, but to use it.
Id.
254.

See Ann C. Scales, Surviving Legal De-Education: An Outsider 's Guide, 1 5

VT.

L. REV.

1 39, 139 (1990) ("Make no mistake about it. The legal system was designed by white men for white
men. The legal system is at once a stunning portrait of white male Christian consciousness, and a
reliable institutional protection of the consciousness.").
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nexus between the course material and their own personal experiences
contributes to the silencing of not only minority students, but women as
well.255
Incorporating d i vers ity issues into traditional curricula attempts
to alleviate this problem by making student voices an essential component
of the diversified pedagogical paradigm.256 The techniques advocated by

The systematic silencing of student "voices" and ideas is not unique to the law school environment.
bell hooks writes that a multicultural educational experience cannot be attained in the absence o f
these voices. See BELL HOOKS, TEACHING TO TRANSGRESS 39-40 ( 1 994). Her reflections on her
teaching career illustrate this point:

I have taught brilliant students of color, many of them seniors, who have skillfully
managed never to speak in classroom settings. Some express the feeling that they are less
likely to suffer any kind of assault if they simply do not assert their subjectivity. They
have told me that many professors never showed any interest in hearing their voices.
Accepting the decentering of the West globally, embracing multiculturalism, compels
educators to focus attention on the issue of voice. Who speaks? Who listens? And why?
Caring about whether all students fulfill their responsibility to contribute to learning in the
classroom is not a common approach in what [Paulo] Freire has called the "banking
system of education" where students are regarded merely as passive consumers. Since so
many professors teach from that standpoint, it is difficult to create the kind of learning
community that can fully embrace multiculturalism. Students are much more willing to
surrender their dependency on the banking system of education than are their teachers.
They are also much more willing to face the challenge of multiculturalism.

Id.
255.

See GUINJER ET AL., supra note 236, at 59. This groundbreaking study of gender attitudes

at the University of Pennsylvania Law School between 1987 and 1 992 explores the role gender plays
in the law school environment.
From the reactions of their professors and the responses to their performance in all areas
o f the institution, some female students learn that they cannot thrive well in the law
school environment. For example, the perception is widespread that within the classroom,
white men are encouraged and allowed to speak more often than women of all colors and
men of color, for longer periods of time, and with greater positive feedback from
professors and peers. When women fail to receive the same level of positive response
from faculty, many experience a blow to their self-esteem. Our data suggest that some
women internalize the absence of positive feedback, even when the professor's aloofness
reaches across gender lines, and some come to believe that they have little to contribute,
becoming further alienated from the law school and the process of legal education.
Others refuse to engage in discussion and opt for a strong stance of silence because they
find the law school's adversarial nature, its focus on argumentation, and its emphasis on
abstract as opposed to contextual reasoning to be unappealing. Their method ofresistance
may be to disengage. Even if this is the case, our data suggest there may be an academic
price for such a stance.
Id.

(footnotes omitted).
256.

See

DoNNA M. GoLLNICK & PHILIP C. CHIN,

MULTICULTURAL

EDUCATION IN A

PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 306-07 (5th ed. 1 998).
Teaching that is multicultural seeks, listens to, and incorporates the student voice.
Students are encouraged to speak from their own experiences, to do more than regurgitate
answers that we would like to hear. Teaching that incorporates the student voice allows
students to make sense of the subject matter within their own realities.

Listening to

student voices helps us know students' prior knowledge of the subject matter, including

[Vol.
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R. Calleros for modifying traditional monocultural

address this issue. 2'7
Professor Calleros suggests
including referring to "diverse populations i n course
hypothetical questions, and written problems."2$8 He

[t]o coax a full range of perspectives from students on provoc ati ve issues,
instructors must lead discussions with sensitivity and open minds. Instructors
will encourage participation from marginalized students by providing materials,
topics, and assignments addressing issues of diversity. Beyond that, faculty
need to set an example for the class by admitting limitations of their own
knowledge and by acknowledging the value of listening to and considering
diverse perspectives, even if initial reaction is to strongly disagree with them. zs9

In addition to using "female pronouns and ethnic names," Professor
Calleros suggests that faculty members develop "a problem, i l lustration,
or hypothetical example in a cultural setting outside of the nonnally
dominant mainstream. "260 Efforts such as these to include student voice
in classroom discourse are essential to the integration of diversity issues
6
within traditional monocultural pedagog y. 2 1

any misinfonnation or lack of infonnation that should suggest future instructional
us

learn important information about students' cultures.

must start from students'

life experiences, not the teacher's life experiences or

strategies. Student voices help
Teaching

the experiences necessary to fit into the dominant school culture.
Id. at 306-07.
257.

See Calleros, supra note 246, at 140.

258.

Id. at 1 50.

259.

Id. at 159.

260.

Id. at 150.

26 1 .

A cautionary note regarding the incorporation of diversity discourse into the classroom

concerns the risk of relying on minority students to represent the "voice" of their communities. A

recent law school graduate wrote of her experiences in law school from the perspective of race and
gender differences:

There are countless stories of people of color being singled out to speak authoritatively
about The Racial Monolith. Sometimes it is

a Professor/student asking

people of color

explicitly to present the racial view; other times it is the fact of being the only whatever

in the class, and having Professors or students look to you for approval. When we discuss

racial issues, my face gets hot and queasy, afraid of the comments that my colleagues
might make and feeling indignant that I must be the educator, always explaining
my/ourselves.

Rita Sethi, Speaking Up! Speaking Out! The Power of Student Speech in Law School Classrooms,
16 WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 6 1 , 63 (1 994); see also bell hooks, supra note 254, at 43 -4 4.
argues:
·

Transfonning these [predominately white classrooms] is

as

great a challenge

as

bell hooks

learning

how to teach well in the setting of diversity. Often, if there is one lone person of color
in the classroom she or he is objectified by others and forced to assume the role of"native
informant." . . . This places an unfair responsibility onto that student Professors can
intervene in this process by making it clear from the outset that experience does not make
one an expert, and perhaps even by explaining what it means to place someone in the role
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In establishing a paradigm for introducing diversity into the curriculum,
Professor Beverly Horsburgh has correctly pointed out that "[m]erely
slipping a case into the traditional discipline in which a plaintiff is a
member of a minority does not eliminate prejudice or broaden a course's
scope of vision, let alone transfonn legal education. It can even lead to
a backlash."262 To illustrate her point, Professor Horsburgh recounts
attempt to introduce diversity into her course:

an

In response to the traditional "Who Sued Whom?" a student told me, "A
colored guy petitioned for custody of a child." I hope I handled the situation
properly when I suggested the appropriate form of address was African
American or black. The student began again and reiterated "This colored guy.
. . ." I again asked that she use different words. The entire class fell into an
uncomfortable silence. No one gasped or indicated by words or gesture any
disapproval of the student's reading of the case. Student solidarity against the
professor as prosecutor or persecutor was in the air. The small number of black
students in the class put their heads down and became engrossed in their notes.
The student started over and this time with great animosity repeated "A colored
guy . . . ." I interrupted for a third time. At this point I stopped trying to
discuss the case and did the unthinkable. I lectured on sensitivity and insisted
on politically correct speech.263
The pedagogical impact o f diversity is not limited to lessons on politi
cally correct speech. As Professor Horsburgh' s experience illustrates,
however, the choice of words used in the classroom by students and
faculty can serve as one of the biggest obstacles to an attempt to create
a comfortable environment for raising issues of race, gender, class,
disability, or sexual orientation.
The diversification of traditional pedagogy through the incorporation
of m inority voices into the monocultural classroom enhances the
classroom experience of both students and faculty members.264 Although

of "native infonnant" It must be stated that professors cannot intervene if they also see
students as "native infonnants."
bell hooks, supra note

262.

254,

at

43-44.

Beverly Horsburgh, Decent and Indecent Proposals in the law: Reflections on Opening the

Contracts Discourse to Include Outsiders,

1

WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 57, 60 (1994).

Professor

Horsburgh further notes that

[o]pening course diversity is more than a numbers game. The outsider's point of view

should also be included to instill sensitivity. Because there are multiple disparate minority
voices as well as many disagreements on approaches and solutions to outsider problems,

any attempt to meaningfully attain diversity can become entangled in a contradictory
jurisprudence.

60-61
263. Id. at 57-58.
264. Unquestionably, traditional

Id. at

legal pedagogy is pedagogy created by the dominant culture for

the dominant culture. Although one could argue that the law school environment has its own unique
pedagogical paradigm, its traditional methods of instruction share common attributes with the

"banking" system of education described by human rights activist Paulo Freire.

Freire sees

640
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the assumption that all minority students will share identical viewpoints
and ideas is clearly erroneous, it is not, however, implausible, given the
current political, economic, and social conditions faced by minority
students, to acknowledge that minority students can offer perspectives that
differ from their white counterparts. 265 For example, discussing the

oppression in any educational system of the banking of infonnation where "education thus becomes
an act of depositing, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor.
Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiques and makes deposits which the students
patiently receive, memorize, and repeat." PAULO FREIRE, P EDAGOGY OF rnE OPPRESSED 53 (Myra
Bergman Rames trans., rev. ed. 1 993).
bell hooks advocates for "engaged pedagogy," which "emphasizes well-being." hooks, supra note
254, at 21. That means that "teachers must be actively committed to a process of self-actualization
that promotes their own well-being if they are to teach in a manner that empowers students. The
empowerment of students, she writes, fosters an educational environment that "does not reflect biases
or reinforce systems of domination," but instead students and teachers "are empowered by the
process." Id. The inspiration for hooks's views is Paulo Freire. hooks states:
When I first began college, Freire's thought gave me the support I needed to challenge
the "banking system" of education, that approach to learning that is rooted in the notion
that all students need to do is consume infom1ation fed to them by a professor and be able
to memorize and store it. Early on, it was Freire's insistence that education could be the
practice of freedom that encouraged me to create strategies for what he called
"conscientization" in the classroom. Translating that term to critical awareness and
engagement, I entered the classrooms with the conviction that it was crucial for me and
every other student to be an active participant, not a passive consumer. Education as the
practice of freedom w as continually undermined by professors who were actively hostile
to the notion of student participation. Freire's work affirme d that education can only be
liberatory when everyone claims knowledge as a field in which we all labor.
Id. at 14.
265. Racial minority group membership does lead to shared experiences which may influence
group members in ways that are definitely different from influences on members of the majority
group. It is these different, shared experiences that diversity seeks to incorporate. See Murphy,
supra note 251, at 542. Murphy argues:
Importantly, the variety of viewpoints that the university seeks to foster does not come
from any innate difference between the races themselves, but rather from the varying life
experiences of the individuals, due in large part to their racial backgrounds. As
University of California at Berkeley President Chang-Lin Tien suggests, "People of
diverse backgrounds tend to shape different questions and apply different methods to find
the answers." New York Times columnist Anthony Lewis adds, "In the lives of
Americans, race is a profound factor. Blacks may be bright or dull, rich or poor, but their
experience in life has been different from whites." This view of diversity provides a
forceful argument against claims that race is an inappropriate proxy for "racial
characteristics."
Id; see also Paul Brest & Miranda Oshige, Affirmative Action for Whom?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 855,
862 (1 995). Brest and Oshige argue:
The importance of a diverse student body and faculty does not depend on the false notion
that one's race or ethnicity defines a particular way of thinking about issues of law and
policy. It does assume the reality-no less a reality because it is socially constructed
that people of different races and ethnicities often have different life experiences that
affect their relations with members of other groups and influence their views on issues
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jurisprudential attributes o f a "Terry Stop"266 with a room full of white
students may not yield a thorough analysis of the relevant socio-political
and racial issues underlying the case. The depth of class discussion will
take on greater significance, however, if minority students are present and
willing to d iscuss either their first-hand experience of "driving while
black,"267 or the impact that being a member of a profiled group has o n
their lives and conduct. 268
The case of Evans v. Abney,269 which is standard reading in first year
Property, further illustrates this point.270 Evans involved an equal

of legal doctrine and policy.

Brest & Oshige, supra, at 862.
266.

See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 ( 1 968). Terry is a watershed decision in which the Supreme

Court upheld a law enforcement technique commonly refem:d to as "stop and frisk" in circumstances
in which the law enforcement officer has only a minimal level of suspicion of criminal activity. See

id.
267.

The tenn "DWB," or "Driving While Black," describes law enforcement's use of racial

profiles to detain African Americans for pretextual traffic violations.

See generally Sheri Lynn

Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain a Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 2 1 4 ( 1983); Jennifer A. Larrabee,

DWB (Driving While Black) and Equal Protection, 6 J.L. & POL'Y 2 9 1 ( 1997); Michael A. Fletcher,

Driven to Extremes: Black Men Take Steps to Avoid Police Stops, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 1996, at
A l ; Paul W. Valentine, Maryland Settles Lawsuit over Racial Profiles: Police Allegedly Targeted
Minorities for Searches, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1995, at B l .
268.

See Rudenstine, supra note 38, at 1 1 . According to Rudenstine,

[d]iscussion and debate are not purely intellectual processes. They involve emotion and
conviction as well as reason and argument. They convert "passion into resolution," and
teach candor and moral courage.

Education and learning arc in this sense human and

moral processes concerned ultimately with values and effective action. They

are

most

fully tested when individuals engage others whose ideas, passions, experiences, and beliefs
differ from their own.

Id.
269.

396 U.S. 435 (1970).

270.

Another example of the barriers to diversity discourse that can be created by language was

conveyed to me by a white professor who was covering intentional infliction of emotional distress
in a first year Torts class. Her class included a small number of African American students. She
sought my advice, as one of two .African American faculty members, regarding the best way to
approach the use of the word "nigger" in her class.

This issue arose as a result of her coverage o f

Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc., 4 6 8 P.2d 2 1 6 (Cal. 1970), i n which an African American truck
driver filed an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress against his employer for the
verbal abuse he suffered at the hands of his white supervisor. The specific verbal abuse related to
a shouting incident in which the following phrase was expressed: "You goddamn 'niggers' are not
going to tell me about the rules. I don't want any 'niggers' working for me. I am getting rid of all
of the 'niggers,'; go pick up and deliver that 8-ton roller to the other job site and get your pay check;
you're fired." Alcorn, 468 P.2d at 2 1 7 .

The professor was concerned that her use of the word during class discussion would be offensive

to some of her students, not only the African Americans. Additionally, she did not want her use
of the word to be perceived as tacit approval of its

use

in normal parlance. We discussed several

possible ways to address this issue, one of which included totally ignoring it. Other suggestions
included the idea of omitting the

case

from her coverage of this subject, or making a disclaimer
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protect ion challenge to the decision of the Georgia Supreme Court to
tenninate a trust created pursuant to the terms of the will of United States
Senator A.O. Bacon. 27 1 Senator Bacon devised land to the City of
Macon, Georgia for use as "a park and pleasure ground" for white people
only. 272 After the United States Supreme C ourt detennined that continued
operation of the park as a segregated facil ity violated the Equal P rotection
C lause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled
that the trust should fail, nd that the corpus of the trust should revert to
the Senator's heirs. 273 The United S tates Supreme Court upheld
Georgia's decision to terminate the trust.274
During the coverage of Evans in one of my courses, a confrontation
occurred between several students regarding the use of racially offensive
words. During the d iscussion, a clear demarcation developed between the
black and white students regarding whether Bacon's intent should control
the court's decision to apply the cy pres doctrine in light of societal
changes that occurred during the years subsequent to the creation of the
trust. In midst of a heated class discussion regarding Senator Bacon's
intent, a white student referred to blacks as ''Negroes" and "coloreds."
Although these terms were used in the case,m the casual use of these
terms during class discussions infuriated some of the students. The
African American students looked to me either to remedy the s ituation or
to empower them into action.276 I stopped the class and attempted to

before the discussion began about the nature of offense associated with the word, or simply banning
the word from the class discussion.

1.{ltimately,

she used the

case,

but substituted for "the N word"

or some other Jess inflammatory word for the word "nigger."

271.
272.
273.
274.

See Evans, 396 U.S.
See id. at 437.
See id. at 438-39.
See id. at 446-47.

at 436.

275.

For example, Senator Bacon's will contained a number of specific references to African

Americans as "Negroes" or "Colored":

I take occasion to say that in limiting the use and enjoyment of this property perpetually
to white people,

I am not influenced by any unkindness of feeling or want of consider

ation for the Negroes, or colored people. On the contrary I have for them the kindest
feeling, and for many of them esteem and regard, while for some of them I have sincere
personal affection.

Id. at 442.
276.

bell hooks discusses the difficulties inherent in incorporating diversity discourse into the

classroom.

See hooks, supra note 254, at 35-36.

She explains that

most of us were taught in classrooms where styles of teachings reflected the notion of a
single norm of thought and experience, which we were encouraged to believe was
universal. This has been just as true for nonwhite teachers as for white teachers. Most

of us learned to teach emulating this model. As a consequence, many teachers are
disturbed by the political implications ofa multicultural education because they fear losing
control in a classroom where there is no one way to approach a subject-only multiple
ways and multiple references.

1 999]

DIVERSilY AND INSTI11JTIONAL AlITONOMY

643

explain the significance and impact of those words to the class.277
C learly, it was ignorance, not racial animosity on the part of the white
student who set this into motion, but his ignorance did not diminish the
rage and anger experienced by some other students, especially the African
American students. 278 In the midst of this experience, however, barriers
were overcome and all of the students gained a greater understanding of
the competing social, h istoric, political, and cultural interests that
influenced the Supreme Court's decision in Evans.

A lthough the words

"Negroes" and "colored" are archaic symbols of a bygone era, their usage
in class discussion served as a barometer of the students' readiness to
engage in diversity discourse and to incorporate diversity issues into the
classroom without the s i m ultaneous introduction of fear, anxiety, and
discomfort. As a result of that experience, when I cover this case, I place

Id. at

35-36. She further argues:
[Faculty] unwillingness to approach teaching from a standpoint that includes awareness

of race, sex, and class is often rooted in the fear that classrooms will be uncontrollable,

that emotions and passions will not be contained. To some extent, we all know that
whenever we address in the classroom subjects that students

are

passionate about there is

always a possibility of confrontation, forceful expression of ideas, or even conflict In
much of my writing about pedagogy, particularly in classroom settings with great
diversity, I have talked about the need to examine critically the way we as teachers
conceptualize what the space for learning should be like. Many professors have conveyed

to me their feeling that the classroom should be a "safe" place; that usually translates to
mean that the professor lectures to a group of quiet students who respond only when they

are called on.

The experience of professors who educate for critical consciousness

indicates that many students, especially students of color, may not feel at all "safe" in
what appears to be a neutral setting. It is the absence of a feeling of safety that often
promotes prolonged silence or lack of student engagement
Id. at

39.
277. Lani Guinier discusses the impact that her role as an African American, female law

professor has on empowering and inspiring her students:
In the conventional sense of the term, I function not only as a teacher but as a symbol
for certain student voices and aspirations. I bear witness as a trophy of achievement My
conspicuous presence may rebut assumptions of group inferiority that undermine student
confidence and performance.

My example not only legitimizes the competence of

matriculating minority students; my visibility helps lure future minority and female
students into the profession.

Role models provide psychological uplift, affirming the

status of black women as law school citizens who can participate fully in the educational
process. By confirming black an d female advancement, black women role models may
also be seen as living symbols of the equal opportunity process.

LANI GUINIER ET AL., supra note

278.

236, at 89-90.

See Rudenstine, supra note 38, at 20. Rudenstine argues:

Real learning, in all its dimensions, rarely takes place altogether easily, without friction
or pain. Indeed, the educational benefits of diversity are often first experienced as forms
o f temporary dislocation and disorientation-just as they can eventually lead to increased
understanding and friendship.

Genuine risks and difficulties

be foolish to pretend otherwise.
Id.

are

involved, and it would
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this case and the words used therein into a historical framework, clearly
pointing out that although acceptable then, the utterance of such words
now is clearly offensive and unacceptable notwithstanding the motivations
of the speaker.
The impact of diversity on law school pedagogy is not limited to
courses that traditionally raise equal protection issues such as constitu
tional law and gender discrimination.279 For example, in a family law
course, Professor Lundy Langston has exam ined how societal d iversity
resulting from demographic changes in society influences pedagogical
methods in that course. Professor Langston argues that the methodology
used to teach fam i ly law should be modified to value the d iversity of
"family lifestyle experiences" that are the product of the pluralistic nature
10
He argues that the absence of such pedagogical
of our society. 2
modifications have a "silencing or normalizing effect" if the focus of a
family law class is based solely on traditional notions of m arriage and
family.281
To counter such effects, he offers several pedagogical
modifications to traditional approaches to family law courses, including
changing the course name to reflect the evolving definition of family,

279.

In addition to selection of course materials, Professor Beverly Horsburgh has offered the

following suggestions for modifying hypothetical Contract problems to reflect an awareness of
diversity issues:
Hypotheticals that essentialize all individuals into the prototypical offeror or offeree
eliminate the significance of differences and the ways in which differences have been so
cially constructed into handicaps. If color and gender, as well as an individual's socio
economic situation,

are

not recognized and brought into the contracts discourse as

substantial barriers that interfere with the exercise of bargaining power, diversity becomes
a masquerade. The prototypical minority offeror who is not encumbered with the social
disadvantages of race, gender, or
ning black face.

both, is only a

male dressed in a skirt or a white don

Nominal inclusion approache s misled students into thinking that

everyone faces the same transactional problems and that these problems are unrelated to
minority status. In using this strategy to include minorities, a professor could desensitize
students from appreciating the difference that differences make in a sexualized, colorized
world.

Horsburgh, supra note 262, at 66-67; see also Calleros, supra note 246, at 147 ("[A]cade mic subjects
set in multicultural contexts that raise issues of difference in our society are worthy mechanisms for
acquiring critical thinking skills. Indeed, they may be superior vehicles for developing the ability
to approach a problem from multiple perspectives an d enhancing sensitivity to potential client
relations problems."); Dark, supra note 250, at SS I ("There are many examples of how to raise or
incorporate diversity issues in many courses like criminal law, contracts, torts, constitutional law, and
even antitrust. The variety of courses suggests something that I believe is fundamentally true : Diver
sity discussions can be integrated throughout the law school curriculum.").
280. Lundy Langston, Political and Social Construction of Families Through Pedagogy in
Family Law Classrooms, 13 DENV. U. L. REV. 1 79, 1 79 (1995).
281. Id.
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focusing on "doctrines such as equal protection, privacy, and personhood
under the Constitution,"212 and finally
[teaching] family law with an emphasis on multiculturalism which would
prevent a "perspectivelessness" view and would provide an education on family
matters according to the various cultural perspectives that make up our
pluralistic society. Implementing a course on the law of relationships would
allow for various lifestyles and cultural differences to be discussed in a way that
would force the students to think about, but not value, varying structures. It
would also encourage students, as future lawyers, to focus on serving the
individual needs of their clients.213
The influence of minority group members on the quality of classroom
discourse was illustrated by the experiences of Professor Leo M. Romero
when discussing the case of State v. Wi/liams214 in his Criminal Law
class. 215 In Williams, an Indian couple was convicted of manslaughter for
failing to obtain medical treatment for their dying child.286 Professor
Romero noted that the contribution of Native American students' voices
to the class he taught in New Mexico enhanced the depth of discourse in
a way that was markedly different from the class discussion of only non-

282. Id. at 199. Langston argues such modifications in family law or similar courses enable
students to see
the benefits of treating an interpersonal relationship as a family and the difficulties that
abound when personal relationships are not treated as family. Intra-family and state and
family cases such as abortion, contraceptive, right to die, parent-child relationships and
property distribution on death, provide excellent opportunities to discuss the legal analysis
and consequences that attend to the determination of whether individuals constitute a
family, without using marriage as the starting or ending point in the discussion.
Id. To further illustrate, Langston cites the anecdotal experiences of a family law professor regarding
efforts to modify the family law course to reflect the expanded definition of family. The professor
recounted :
I followed the family definition discussion with an exploration of what I called "Family
Formation via Procreation." During this segment we examined issues involved in
contraception, abortion, sterilization, rights of the fetus and new reproductive techniques,
such as surrogacy and alternate insemination. The result of covering this material at the
beginning of the course that discusses marriage, divorce and custody, has been that we
did not discuss marriage until the fourth week of the semester. By then, the students
appeared to be accepting the notion that "family" did not require or mean marriage.
While my experience is anecdotal at best, it certainly raised the prospect of moving the
discussion of family further back in the course and discussing more legal doctrine that
affects "families" rather than "marriages."
Id. at 200 n . 1 56 (citation omitted).
283. Id. at 198.
284. State v. Williams, 484 P.2d 1 1 67 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
285. See Romero, supra note 2 5 1 , at 8.
286. See Williams, 484 P.2d at 1 1 74.
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Native American students at Roger Williams University in Rhode
Island. 287 He observed that
[t]he participatio n of Native Americans enriches the learning of the other
students who hear new concerns and perspectives. Likewise, the Indian students
learn from non-Native American students, often parents, who approach the case
from the perspective of protecting all children and question the assumptions and
opinions voiced by the Indian students. Such a rich discussion, in my opinion,
enhances the learning of all students in the c lass. They learn about d ifferences
in culture and values and the extent to which the law should take into account
these differences; they also learn the importance of listening to others and of
trying to make law just for everyone. My students at Roger Williams,
unfortunately, did not get the benefit of this first-hand discussion.211

Inquiry, Research, and Scholarship

3.

This final area of inquiry focuses on the impact that diversity has on
the goals of inquiry, research, and scholarship.289 Within the legal
academy, to continue my example, the i ncreased presence of racial and
ethnic minority students and faculty in the classroom has had a tremen
dous impact on legal scholarship.290 This entry of minorities into the

287.

See Romero, supra note 25 1 , at 8.

This fall

the discussion

lacked the insights and perspectives that I had come to expect

from my experience with Native American students in the class. Questions like whether
the court was applying white middle class norms of behavior to the Indian defendants,

whether the test for negligence should be modified

to take into account the reasonable

Shoshone parent and nontraditional health care, and whether such modification would
mean a lower standard of care for Indian children are just some of the questions that are
frequently raised in my

course

in New Mexico.

Id.
288.

Id.

289.

Mildred Garcia argues that a strategic emphasis for the continued "formulation and

strengthening of affirmative action policies" should be placed on qualitative and quantitative research
efforts that "definitively demonstrate the benefits of affirmative action policies and the educational

value and experiences they promote." Garcia, supra note 244, at 256. The fourth component of

Garcia's eight-point strategic plan focuses solely on research goals:

4. Encourage faculty members to conduct research to substantiate the value and success
of diversity and affirmative action policies. The results of these studies need to be
published in the popular press and should emphasize the use of strong assessment and
evaluation components.

Id.
290.

See

Murphy, supra note 251 , at 543. Murphy argues that

[t]he diversification of the faculty and student bodies at American colleges and
universities has already fostered a movement to rethink and reshape university curriculums
into racially and ethnically inclusive foundations for study. Chang-Lin Tien explains: In
legal education, the addition of women scholars opened the field of feminist jurispru·

dence, which uses new methodologies and new perspectives in shaping answers. Another
new area of legal scholarship is critical race theory. African-American, Hispanic, and
Asian-American scholars

arc

questioning the legal treatment of racial and · ethnic groups
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academy affords previously excluded voices the opportunity to contribute
their own historical, cultural, and experiential perspectives to ongoing
jurisprudential dialogues, thus shaping and influencing the development
of our legal system in ways that are more representative of the demo
graphic framework of our society.29 1 In addition, diversification of
students and faculty fosters an atmosphere in which m inority group
members can examine areas that are of specific interest or importance to
them and the constituencies they represent.292 Indicative of this diversifi
cation are the new areas of legal scholarship, such as "Critical Race
theory, "293 feminist legal theory, 294 and "LatCrit" theory, m that developed

and exploring the implications of this treatment on the entire system of justice.
Id.
29 1 .

See

Mari J. Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls, Multiple Consciousness as Jurisprudential

Method, A Talk Presented at the Yale Law School Conference on Women of Color and the Law,

April 16, 1988,

l l WOMEN'S Rrs. L. REP. 7, 8 (1989). Matsuda states:
Outsider scholars have recognized that their specific experiences and histories are relevant
to jurisprudential inquiry. They reject narrow evidentiary concepts of relevance and
credibility. They reject artificial bifurcation of thought and feeling. Their anger, their
pain, their daily lives, and the histories of their people are relevant to the definition of
justice.

Id.

See Brest & Oshige, supra note 265, at 864. Brest and Oshige argue that
[t]hese observations apply not only to students, but to the faculty in their mission of
producing and disseminating knowledge. Skepticism about the relevance of diverse life
experiences to a university's mission sometimes manifests itself in the observation that a
work of scholarship must stand or fall on its own merits, without regard to the scholar's
group affiliation. While we have no doubt that this observation is true, it fails to negate
the equally obvious point that different life experiences affect scholars' agendas,
viewpoints, and approaches to their subjects in ways that enhance knowledge. Especially
in law, where regulations and judicial decisions affect different groups differently, it
would be amazing if a scholar's experiences did not affect her outlook and interests, and
hence her work. The presence of women and minority scholars bas in fact changed the
intellectual landscape of some areas of law, and their influence has permeated fields that
many would not have imagined had much connection with gender or race. In any subject
where a faculty member's experience brings different perspectives to her scholarship, it
will likely enhance her teaching in similar ways.
Id. (citations omitted).
293. See, e.g. , CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUITING EDGE (Richard Delgado ed., 1995);
CRITICAL RACE lHEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberle Crenshaw
et al. eds., 1 995); Raneta J. Lawson, Critical Race Theory as Praxis: A View From Outside the
Outside, 3 8 How. L.J. 353 (1995); Eric K. Yamamoto, Critical Race Praxis: Race Theory and
Political Lawyering Practice in Post-Civil Rights America, 95 MICH. L. REV. 82 1 , 875-80 (1997).
For a discussion of Critical Race Theory and its impact on hate speech jurisprudence, see generally,
MARI ]. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, AsSAULTIVE SPEECH,
292.

AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 3 ( 1 993).

Teachers of color in the legal academy who chose to join this tradition of radical teaching
have sought, in their teaching and scholarship, to articulate the values and modes of
analysis that inform their vocation of struggle. These efforts have produced an emerging
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as a result of the increased number of m inorities in the legal academy.
In addition, recent legal textbook publications also reflect the inclusion
of issues pertaining to race, gender, class, disability, and sexual orienta
tion into the classroom. 296 As law schools continue to hire minority
faculty, some of these individuals will continue to focus their research
interests to reflect experiences and ideas originating from their own
cultural and historic perspectives. 297
Finally, scholarship diversification is i n direct response to the increased
role played by the judiciary in its modem interpretation of the constitu
tional protections and limitations afforded to all members of society. As
long as legal challenges to the use of race-based admissions criteria
remain at the forefront of American j urisprudence, inquiry and research
in this area of constitutional interpretation will continue to flourish. This
Article is but one of dozens of articles298 and symposia299 publ ished in the

genre known

as

critical race theory. Critical race theory is grounded in the particulars of

social reality that is defined by our experiences and the collective historical experience
of our communities of origin. Critical race theorists embrace subjectivity of perspective
and are avowedly political.

Our work is both pragmatic and utopian,

as

we seek to

respond to the immediate needs of the subordinated and oppressed even as we imagine
a different world and offer different values.

It is work that involves both action and

reflection. It is infonncd by active struggle and in tum informs that struggle.

Id.

294.

See generally FEMINIST JURISPRUDENCE (Patricia Smith ed., 1993); FEMINIST LEGAL

THEORY: FOUNDATIONS (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1993); Pamela D. Bridgewater, Connectedness and

Closeted Questions: Tire Use of Hutory in Developing Feminut Legal Theory, 1 1 WIS. WOMEN S
'

L.J. 35 1 (1997); Vicki Quade, Redefining Notions: Feminist Legal Theory Pushes into the

Mainstream, 20 HUM. RTS. 8 ( 1 993); Deborah L. Rhode, Feminist Critical Theories, 42 STAN. L.

REV. 617 (1990).
295. See generally Franciso Valdes, Under Construction: LatCritConsciousness, Community, and
Theory, 10 LA RAzA L.J. 3 ( 1 998).

296.

See supra note 238.

297.

See generally, e.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 252; Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Autobiography

and Legal Scholarship and Teaching: Finding the Me in the legal Academy, 77 VA. L. REV. 539

( 1 991); Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Toward a Black legal Scholarship: Race and Original
Understandings, 1 99 1 DUKE L.J. 39; Okianer Christian Dark, Just My 'Magination, 1 0 HARV.
BLACKLEITER J. 2 1 ( 1 993); Angela Mae Kupenda, Making Traditional Courses More Inclusive:
Confessions of an African American Female Professor Who Attempted to Crash All the Barriers at
Once, 31 U.S.F. L. REV. 975 (1997); Robinson, supra note 250; Jennifer M. Russell, On Being A

Gorilla in Your Midst, or, The Life ofOne Blackwoman in the legal Academy, 28 HARV. C. R.-C.L.
L. REv. 259 (1993); Young, supra note 250.
298. See generally Lackland H. Bloom, Jr., Hopwood, Bakke and the Future of the Diversity
Justification, 29 TEx. TECH L. REV. I (1998); Brest & Oshige, supra note 265. Richard Delgado,

Five Months later (The Trial Court Opinion}, 7 1 TEx. L. REV. 101 1 (1993); Daniel A. Farber, The
Outmoded Debate over Affirmative Action, 82 CAL. L. REv. 893 (1994); Lino A. Graglia,
Podbcresky, Hopwood, and Adarand: Implications for the Future ofRace Based Programs, 1 6 N.
ILL. U. L. REV. 287 ( 1 996); Murphy, supra note 25 1 .
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last fifteen years in furtherance of diversity issues such as affinnative
action, civil rights, and discrimination-all of which were either in
response to, or an attempt to, influence judicial decision-making. Clearly,
the impact on the research and publication functions of universities has
been, and will continue to be, influenced by the presence of diversity not
only within the academy, but within society as a whole.
The educational community is not an isolated environment. On the
contrary, it is an amalgamation of diverse people, issues, interests and
concerns. The admissions decision-making process used to assemble the
members of this amalgam must reflect this diversity.300 Within the legal
academy, legal scholarship, as well as the content and methods of
classroom instruction, are being modified to reflect, either directly or
indirectly, the academy's response to the presence of racial minorities
within this environment. 301 The successful integration of racial and ethnic

299.

See Symposium, Race Relations in America, 27 GoLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 287 ( 1 997);

Symposium, Critical Race Perspectivesfor the New Millennium-Second Annual Northeastern People
ofColor Legal Scholarship Conference, 3 1 NEW ENG.

L. REV. 705 ( 1 997); Symposium, Race-Based

Remedies, 84 CAL. L. REV. 875 ( 1 996); Symposium, Polilical Correctness in the J990s and Beyond,

23 N. KY. L. REV. 471 (1996); Symposium, The Role ofAffirmalive Aclion in lhe 1990s, 23 S. U.
L. REV. I 07 ( 1 996); Symposium, Affirmalive Action and lhe California Civil Righls Initiative, 27 U.

WEST L. A. L. REV. 26S (1996); Symposium, Race and &medy in a Mullicullural Society, 47 STAN.

L. REV. 855 ( 1 995); Symposium, Post-Croson, 383 URB. LAW. 3 8 1 ( 1 994); Symposium, Race
Consciousness and Legal Scholarship, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 945 ( 1 992); Symposium, The FulUre

of Affirmalive Aclion, 44 ARK. L. REv. 9 1 5 ( 1991); Symposium, Diversily and the Law, 1 7 WM.

MITCHELL L. REV. 393 (1991); Symposium, A.ff/1'1'1Qtive Action, 2 1 GA. L. REV. 1007 (1987);
Symposium, Affirmative Action, 12 IOWA

L. REV. 2S5 (1987); Symposium, Minorily Legal

Pedagogy: Foundation for Parlicipation in lhe Legal Profession, 1 2 T. MARsHALL L. REV. 299
( 1 987).
300.

See Hurtado &. Navia, supra note 234, at 127. Hurtado and Navia made the following

recommendation:
In addition, higher education institutions and their admissions offices should assess the
extent to which they have relied upon affirmative action as the primary means for

diversifying their campuses and student bodies. The use of racial preferences in college

admissions is a legal way to ensure diversity, but more documentation may be necessary
i n terms of providing information on historical and continuous barriers that women and

different racial/ethnic groups face in gaining admission. Admissions officers at selective

colleges must also acknowledge the biases that result from employing specific criteria for
different groups and address them by considering a wide range of infonnation on each
candidate, and then selecting students who excel along several dimensions. Moreover,

as

with all other types of preferences in admissions, institutions must be able to articulate
how their selection practices are consistent with the institution's mission and goals. The
goal of educating a diverse student body is not only important to educational processes
within the institution, but also extends beyond the campus community to the larger social

goals of decreasing inequality, improving race relations, and increasing economic
productivity and civic participation among broad segments of society.
Id.
30 1 .

See Finkin, supra note 13, at 846.
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minorities within the academy will continue to necessitate changes in
historically accepted pedagogical approaches. As a result, diversification
of the American classroom has becom e an academic exercise aimed at
fostering the "[t]he atmosphere of 'speculation, experiment and creation"'
that Justice Powell sought in Baklce. 302
IV. LIMITS ON

TIIE

EXERCISE OF INSTI11JTIONAL AUTONOMY

As defined in Part III, the exercise o f institutional autonomy is only
protected by the First Amendment when an educational institution is
engaged in academic decision-making. More specifically, in the absence
of evidence of past discrimination, only academic decisions undertaken
with the goal of attaining a diverse student body may serve as constitu
tional justification for the use .of race-based classifications. Although
this doctrine is limited in scope by its applicability only to academic
decisions, the opportunity for abuse exists.
For example, universities may use the protections afforded by the First
Amendment to restructure the admissions decision-making process to
exclude disfavored racial and ethnic minorities, particular gender groups,
or individuals with unpopular social or political ideologies. To avoid this
result, additional l im itations are necessary. 3 03 In Bakke, Justice Powell
cautioned that the recognition of institutional autonomy to foster diversity
within the academic environment is not absolute, but must be tempered
by "constitutional limitations protecting individual rights."304 Part IV
explores the question left unanswered by Justice Powell's admonition;
that is, how far can educational institutions go in the exerci se of their
right to select a diverse student body before infringing on the equal
protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Further limitation of this doctrine requires adherence to a narrow
interpretation of Justice Powell's definition of diversity. As set forth in

302. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 3 1 2 ( 1978).
303. See Byrne, supra note 41, at 338. Professor Byrne suggested the followi ng:
as importantly, constitutional academic freedom ought not to protect instituti ons
resembling universities but which do not pursue genuine liberal studies-that prohibit or
consistently discourage professors from following controversial arguments, that recognize

Just

no role for faculty in governance, or that seek to indoctrinate rather than educate students.
In other words, universities that do not respect the academic freedom of professors (under
stood as the core of the doctrine developed by the AAUP) or the essential intelle ctual
freedom of students (a concept barely developed) ought not to be afforded institutional
autonomy. This limitation, dictated by the justification for the right, may lessen fears that
institutional freedom will cloak extensive violations of professors' academic freedom by
institutions bent on intellectual orthodoxy. Institutions so perverse in their ends will
suffer the loss of constitutional status, a risk that may deter abuses.

Id.

(footnote omitted).

304. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 3 14.
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Bakke, diversity was defined not simply in terms of racial or ethnic
diversity, but as Justice Powell explained, "diversity that furthers a
compelling state interest encompasses a far broader array of qualifications
and characteristics of which racial or ethnic origin is but a single though
important element."305
In addition to requiring the individualized
evaluation of every appl icant, an educational institution must consider
factors "likely to promote beneficial educational pluralism."306 Although
the concept of diversity is based, in large part, on a case-by-case
determination, Justice Powell offered guidance in defining the parameters
necessary to achieve "educational pluralism."307 I n their efforts to attain
a diversified student body, educational institutions are not restricted to
considering only "students from disadvantaged economic, racial and
ethnic groups," but may also consider such factors as a student' s
geographic background and social and academic interests.308
Limiting the extension of institutional autonomy to admissions
decisions that fall within the parameters of strict adherence to the letter
and spirit o f Justice Powell ' s definition of diversity will ensure that only
educational policies conforming to this standard will benefit from First
Amendment guarantees that insulate the exercise of institutional
autonomy.309 Neil Rudenstine has stated:

The most constructive and well-conceived admissions programs are those that
view affinnative action in relation to the educational benefits of diversity. They
may take various characteristics such as race, ethnicity, or gender into account
as potential "plus" factors (among many others) when evaluating candidates, but
they do not assign such characteristics an overriding value. Nor do they aim to
achieve specific numerical targets, either through the use of set-asides or quotas.
They involve energetic efforts in outreach, but not mandated outcomes.
Programs of this kind, when they are carefully designed and implemented,
preserve an institution's capacity-with considerable flexibility-to make its
own detenninations in admissions. This capacity and flexibility have been
critical in the past, and will continue to be so in the future.310

305.
306.
307.
308.

Id. at 3 15.
Id. at 3 1 7.
Id.
Id. at 322 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J.). With respect to the attainment ofa diverse

medical school student body, Justice Powell identified several important factors including "excep
tional personal talents, unique work or service experience, leadership potential, maturity,
demonstrated compassion, a history of overcoming disadvantage, ability to communicate with the
poor, or other qualifications deemed important" Id. at 317. In this regard, Justice Powell cited with
approval the use of race and ethnicity in the admissions decision-making model used by Harvard
College. See id. at 3 16-18. A description of the Harvard Admissions program was set forth in the
appendix to Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke. See id. at 321-24.
309. See discussion supra Part 11.B.
3 10. Rudenstine, supra note 38, at 45.
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Additionally, such adherence will eliminate attempts to extend
constitutional protection to definitions of diversity that are inconsistent
with Justice Powell ' s mandate. For example, the First Circuit in
Wessmann v. Gittens,3 1 1 assumed that the goal of attainment of diversity
of a student body could justify the use of racial and ethnic admissions
criteria for the purpose of withstanding an equal protection challenge.312
However, after evaluating the admissions policies in light of Justice
Powell 's definition of diversity, the Wessmann court noted that the
school's admissions policy focused exclusively on racial and ethnic
diversity.3 13 This pool of potential students was further restricted to "only
five group�lacks, whites, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Ameri
cans-without recognizing that none is monolithic."3 14
The court
concluded that the school's selection criteria "appear[ed] to be less a
means of attaining diversity in any constitutionally relevant sense and
more a means for racial balancing."3 1s The resulting racial balancing,
coupled with the policy's impermissible focus on specific group
characteristics instead of individualized evaluations, led the First Circuit
to conclude that the admissions policy was inconsistent with the "concept
of diversity" as articulated by Justice Powell in Bakke.3 1 6
In the event academic decision-making is engaged in for the sole
purpose of racial exclusion, and not in accordance with the purpose of
attaining diversity, First Amendment insulation would yield to counter
vailing equal protection considerations. Although this analysis is
consistent with the Supreme Court's historic rejection of racially

311.
3 1 2.
3 1 3.

160 F.3d 790 (lst Cir. 1998).
See id. at 800.
See id. at 798.

3 14.

Id.

3 1 5.

Id. The court stated:
It cannot be said that racial balancing is either a legitimate or necessary means of
advancing the lofty principles recited in the Policy. The closest the School Committee
comes to linking racial balancing to these ideals is by introducing the concept of "racial
isolation." The idea is that unless there is a certain representation of any given racial or
ethnic group in a particular institution, members of that racial or ethnic group will find
it difficult, if not impossible, to express themselves. Thus, the School Committee says,

some minimum number of black and Hispanic students-precisely how many, we do not
know-is required

Id. at

to prevent racial isolation.

799.

3 1 6.

See id. The Wessman court commented on the admissions policy as follows:
Either way, the School Committee tells us that a minimum number of persons of a given
race (or ethnic background) is essential to facilitate individual expression. This very
position concedes that the Policy's raciaVethnic guidelines treat "individuals as the product
of their race," a practice that the Court consistently has denounced as impermissible
stereotyping.

Id.
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exclusive classifications, 3 1 7 consideration of racial and ethnic characteris
tics remain an essential component of the diversity paradigm.318 A s
Justice Powell recognized, however, the inclusive nature of diversity
cannot be realistically achieved without the consideration of race and
ethnicity as factors in the process.
V.

CONCLUSION

Expansion of First Amendment guarantees o f academic freedom to
educational institutions w i l l ensure that educational institutions have the
right to select a diversified student body without excessive judicial

3 1 7.

There is a long line of S upreme Court cases beginning with Missouri

ex

rel Gaines

v.

Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1 938), in which the Court noted that such exclusionary conduct was
specifically prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment For example, in Gaines, Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes concluded as follows:
By the operation of the laws of Missouri a privilege has been created for white law
students which is denied to negroes by reason of their race.

The white resident is

afforded legal education within the State; the negro resident having the same qualifications
is refused it there and must go outside the State to obtain it.

That is a denial of the

equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege which the State has set up, and
the provision for the payment of tuition fees in another State does not remove the
discrimination.

Id. at 349-50.

Similarly, in Sweatt

v.

Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1 950), the Court ordered Herman Sweatt's

admission to the University of Texas Law School.

In that decision, Chief Justice Vinson, in

reiterating the Court's burgeoning commitment to equality of the laws, concluded that the "petitioner
may claim his full constitutional right

legal education equivalent to that offered by the State to

students of other races. Such education is not available to him in a separate law school as offered
by the State." Id. at 635. These cases paved the way for the Court's landmark decision in Brown,

in which the Supreme Court finally concluded that segregation in public education constituted a

deprivation of the "equal protection o f the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment" Brown
v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1 954).
3 1 8.

But see CARL COHEN, NAKED RACIAL PREFERENCE 77 ( 1995). Professor Cohen commented

as follows:

Finally, there is one troubling aspect of the Bakke decision that flows directly from the

Powell principles.

It may be taken to proffer an invitation that could lead to most

unhappy practices. We

are

told that the Constitution permits the consideration of race in

admissions for the sake of diversity to further the First Amendment interest in free ex·
pression. That being so, it would appear that other suspect classifications-by political
affiliation or by religion-may also be used for the sake of diversity.

This is a

disquieting result. Should the fact that one is a Republican or a Socialist, Catholic or Jew,
be allowed to count in the distribution of opportunities?

Even if by invoking such

considerations we could increase diversity in some contexts, they surely ought never be
factors in the apportionment o f any public goods. History gives us strong reasons to con
clude that the uses of such classifications, even for putatively honorable goals, invite

disaster. We forswear them. For the same reasons, even ifBakke permits us to promote

Id.

diversity in a student body, it will be the part of wisdom to forswear the use of race as
well.
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scrutiny. Notwithstanding equal protection guarantees, the Supreme
Court has recognized that there are some areas of society that must be
protected from excessive governmental interference. The attainment of
diversity within the educational environment is worthy of such protection.
Institutional autonomy is a necessary component of this effort. Educa
tional institutions can only function in an atmosphere that affords them
with the opportunity to make academic decisions that preserve the
"marketplace of ideas" that is the foundation of the academic community.
Assembling this marketplace requires the admission of groups of people
with diverse interests, backgrounds, and life experiences. S uch diversi
fied admissions decision-making modifies existing educational paradigms,
and influences every facet of the traditional goals of an educational
institution-teaching, inquiry, research and scholarship.

